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JUSTICE ALITO’S DISSENT IN  
LOVING v. VIRGINIA 
CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE* 
Abstract: In 1967, in Loving v. Virginia, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously 
struck down miscegenation statutes, which criminalized interracial marriage, as un-
constitutional. In 2013, the Court in United States v. Windsor invalidated Section 3 
of the so-called Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), which precluded federal 
agencies from recognizing marriages between same-sex couples even if the mar-
riages were legally valid in the couples’ home state. While Loving was a unanimous 
decision, the Court in Windsor was closely divided. Almost half a century after 
Chief Justice Warren issued his unanimous Loving opinion, the Loving dissent has 
been written. Justice Alito authored it in Windsor. Justice Alito fashioned his dis-
sent as upholding DOMA. But the rationales he employed were much more suited 
to the facts of Loving than the facts of Windsor. In this Article, Professor Leslie ex-
plains how each of Justice Alito’s reasons for upholding DOMA applies equally or 
more strongly to miscegenation laws at the time of the Loving opinion than to 
DOMA in 2013. There is simply no internally consistent way to defend DOMA 
with Justice Alito’s arguments without also upholding the constitutionality of mis-
cegenation laws. Thus, Justice Alito not only authored a dissent for the Windsor 
case; he effectively wrote a dissent in Loving nearly 50 years after the case was de-
cided. His reasoning would require the upholding of Virginia’s miscegenation stat-
ute. To the extent that the legal community now recognizes that the former anti-
miscegenation regimes represent a shameful chapter of American history, the fact 
that the same arguments used to defend miscegenation laws are being invoked to 
justify bans on same-sex marriage suggests that such bans are inherently suspect 
and probably unconstitutional. 
INTRODUCTION 
Marriage is an institution both sacred and civil. Couples decide to get mar-
ried for a variety of reasons. Some marry as a religious sacrament. Others get 
married to secure the bundle of rights conferred upon married couples by feder-
al, state, local, and foreign governments. Some couples get married because of 
the social acceptance afforded by friends, family, and community to married 
couples. Some couples get married to express their love and commitment to each 
other. Most couples get married for multiple reasons, including some or all of the 
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above.1 Whatever the reason or reasons, the marriage proposal, its acceptance, 
and the ceremony itself are generally joyous events. 
A couple’s decision to marry becomes less joyous when government offi-
cials prohibit the marriage or refuse to recognize its legitimacy. State govern-
ments regulate who may marry whom as a civil matter. They enact restrictions, 
for example, setting minimum age requirements. Historically, most states im-
posed race restrictions, generally criminalizing interracial marriage.2 In 1883, in 
Pace v. Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court held that such laws did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause because neither black people nor white people could 
marry across racial boundaries and, thus, both races were treated equally. As of 
this writing, many states impose gender restrictions, refusing to allow or recog-
nize same-sex marriages as valid civil marriages. 
In the context of race and gender restrictions, courts have played a critical 
role in bringing greater equality to America’s marriage laws. The stories of three 
couples—Sylvester Davis and Andrea Perez; Richard Loving and Mildred Jeter; 
and Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer—illustrate this phenomenon. Los Angeles 
residents Sylvester Davis and Andrea Perez were in love and sought to make their 
relationship permanent through marriage. Unfortunately, in the 1940s California 
maintained an intricate anti-miscegenation regime that proscribed marriages 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95–96 (1987) (discussing marriages as “expressions of emo-
tional support and public commitment,” as “an exercise of religious faith as well as an expression of 
personal dedication,” and as “a precondition to the receipt of government benefits (e.g., Social Securi-
ty benefits), property rights (e.g., tenancy by the entirety, inheritance rights), and other, less tangible 
benefits . . . .”). 
 2 PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE MAKING OF 
RACE IN AMERICA 6 (2009) (“Miscegenation law reached well beyond the South. When the term 
‘miscegenation’ was invented, laws prohibiting interracial marriage were in effect not only there but 
also in Maine and Rhode Island; in Michigan, Illinois, and Ohio; in California, Nebraska, and Wash-
ington. By the end of the nineteenth century, the laws had spread to cover nearly all the states of the 
U.S. West . . . .”); id. at 2 (“In the North and South, states usually banned marriages between Whites 
and Blacks, but in the American West, to which the laws were extended in the late nineteenth century, 
legislatures prohibited (depending on the state) marriages between Whites and American Indians, 
native Hawaiians, Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, Koreans, and Hindus.”); see NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC 
VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 43 (2000) (“Community sentiment against whites 
marrying African Americans was not limited to the south in the antebellum decades. Intermarriage 
bans and penalties echoed each other from state to state, north and south, east and west, together com-
posing an American system.”); RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, 
IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 219 (2003) (“Every state whose black population reached or exceeded 5 
percent of the total eventually drafted and enacted antimiscegenation laws.” (citing Joseph Golden, 
Patterns of Negro-White Intermarriage, 19 AM. SOC. REV. 144 (1954))); PASCOE, supra, at 21 (listing 
specific miscegenation laws); cf. Edward T. Wright, Comment, Interracial Marriage: A Survey of 
Statutes and Their Interpretations, 1 MERCER L. REV. 83, 88 (1949) (“Though many states which 
have miscegenation laws have a large population of members of the race prohibited from marrying 
whites, there are many states which do not. North Dakota has a statute on its books prohibiting Ne-
groes and whites from marrying despite the fact that there are only two hundred and one Negroes in 
the entire state.”). 
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across defined racial lines.3 Because the State classified Sylvester Davis as “a 
Negro male” and Andrea Perez as “a white female,” their marriage was illegal.4 
Although their Catholic church did not prohibit their marriage, the State did. Dan 
Marshall, a lawyer and the President of the Catholic Interracial Council in Los 
Angeles, believed that the couple would make excellent plaintiffs to challenge 
California’s miscegenation law.5 Against the advice and admonitions of the Cath-
olic Church hierarchy,6 Marshall persevered in the legal challenge. In its 1948 
opinion in Perez v. Sharp, the California Supreme Court became the first state 
high court since Reconstruction to strike down an anti-miscegenation law as un-
constitutional.7 A narrowly divided court held—in a 4-to-3 opinion—that Cali-
fornia’s law violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Writing 
for the majority, Justice Traynor concluded that marriage “is a fundamental right 
of free men” and the miscegenation laws impermissibly impinge the “liberty to 
marry.”8 
Although the California ruling represented a sea change, it did little to ben-
efit interracial couples living in states that continued to maintain miscegenation 
statutes, like the states of the former confederacy.9 In 1958, Richard Loving and 
Mildred Jeter lived in Virginia, a state whose supreme court had upheld its mis-
cegenation law in 1955 and 1956.10 Because Richard was white and Mildred 
black, they had to leave their home state to get married. Upon returning from 
Washington, D.C. as a married couple, a grand jury indicted the Lovings for vio-
lating Virginia’s miscegenation law.11 After pleading guilty, the Lovings were 
sentenced to one year in jail, which the trial judge suspended, conditioned upon 
the Lovings not returning to Virginia together for 25 years.12 The Lovings chal-
                                                                                                                           
 3 Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 18 (Cal. 1948). 
 4 PASCOE, supra note 2, at 211 (describing how Marshall chose not to challenge the racial classi-
fication by the marriage license bureau of Mexican Americans as white, a tactic other attorneys had 
used); see Perez, 198 P.2d at 18. 
 5 See id. 
 6 See infra notes 42–48 and accompanying text. 
 7 Perez, 198 P.2d at 29. 
 8 Id. at 19; see also id. (“The right to marry is as fundamental as the right to send one’s child to a 
particular school or the right to have offspring.”). 
 9 RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE & ROMANCE 87 
(2001). Professor Moran noted: 
Despite the clarity and comprehensiveness of the majority decision in Perez, it did not 
immediately prompt other state courts or the U.S. Supreme Court to strike down anti-
miscegenation statutes as unconstitutional. Indeed, other states continued to enforce the 
laws vigorously. One year after the Perez decision, a man in Ellisville, Mississippi, was 
sentenced to five years in prison for marrying a white woman.  
Id.  
 10 Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E.2d 849, 850 (Va. 1956); Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955). 
 11 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2–3 (1967). 
 12 Id. at 3. The Virginia Supreme Court later reversed this banishment penalty. Loving v. Com-
monwealth, 147 S.E.2d 78, 83 (Va. 1966). 
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lenged the constitutionality of the miscegenation law.13 In 1967, the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Loving v. Virginia unanimously rejected the 1883 equal-
treatment reasoning of Pace v. Alabama14 and struck down all miscegenation 
statutes as unconstitutional, rendering the Lovings legally wed in every state of 
the union.15 
Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer had been a couple for decades but were le-
gally prevented from getting married because their love—like that of the Lov-
ings before them—was forbidden. As two women living in a country with gen-
der-specific marriage laws, Edith and Thea could not get married at home. When 
Canada began to recognize same-sex marriage, Edith and Thea seized the oppor-
tunity to make their commitment official. They traveled to Ontario in 2007 and 
had a legal marriage ceremony performed.16 The State of New York, where 
Edith and Thea resided, eventually recognized their marriage as legally valid. 
The federal government, however, did not. In 1996, Congress had enacted the 
so-called Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), Section 3 of which precluded 
federal agencies from recognizing marriages between same-sex couples even if 
the marriages were legally valid in the couples’ home state. Consequently, when 
Thea passed away and left her entire estate to her wife Edith, the IRS charged 
Windsor over $363,000 because the agency refused to recognize her as a surviv-
ing spouse. When Windsor challenged section 3 of DOMA as unconstitutional, 
Justice Kennedy—writing for a narrowly divided Court in its 2013 opinion in 
United States v. Windsor—opined that the statute “violate[d] basic due process 
and equal protection principles” of the Fifth Amendment and struck it down.17 
The opinions in Perez, Loving, and Windsor have more in common than 
just the subject of marriage equality. The arguments made against applying 
Equal Protection principles to marriage discrimination were the same across all 
three cases. This suggests that just as the arguments in favor of miscegenation 
laws proved unpersuasive—and often offensive—the arguments against same-
sex marriage are likewise unconvincing.18 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See Christopher R. Leslie, Embracing Loving: Trait-Specific Marriage Laws and Heightened 
Scrutiny, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1102 (2014). 
 14 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883). 
 15 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
 16 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2679 (2013). 
 17 Id. at 2693. 
 18 Several prominent scholars have discussed the analogy between miscegenation laws and bans 
on same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Stephen Clark, Same-Sex but Equal: Reformulating the Miscegena-
tion Analogy, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 107, 120–85 (2002); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Gay Rights” for 
“Gay Whites”?: Race, Sexual Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 
1377–78 (2000); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex 
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 200–01 (1994); R. A. Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy: Perez v. 
Sharp, Antimiscegenation Law, and the Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 872 
(2008); Josephine Ross, Riddle for Our Times: The Continued Refusal to Apply the Miscegenation 
Analogy to Same-Sex Marriage, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 999, 1009–15 (2002); Josephine Ross, Sex, 
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The similarity of the arguments also raises an interesting thought experi-
ment. In its unanimous decision,19 the Supreme Court in Loving held that misce-
genation laws violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Today, how do we perceive arguments made to defend laws that forbade 
interracial couples from marrying? Do we consider them credible, worthy of 
respect? What would we think today of a Justice who had written a dissent in the 
Loving case? Would we perceive that Justice the way that many view Chief Jus-
tice Roger Taney, the author of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1857 opinion in Dred 
Scott v. Sandford?20 The question is not just rhetorical because almost half a cen-
tury after Chief Justice Warren issued his unanimous Loving opinion, the Loving 
dissent has been written—Justice Alito authored it in United States v. Windsor. 
Justice Alito fashioned his dissent as upholding DOMA. But the rationales he 
employed were better suited to the facts of Loving than the facts of Windsor. 
This Article examines the rationales that Justice Alito espoused for uphold-
ing DOMA. After addressing the standing issues in the case,21 Justice Alito ad-
vanced five substantive arguments in his dissent for why the Court should not 
intervene and invalidate DOMA: (1) the Court should avoid ruling on controver-
                                                                                                                           
Marriage and History: Analyzing the Continued Resistance to Same-Sex Marriage, 55 SMU L. REV. 
1657, 1668 (2002); Josephine Ross, The Sexualization of Difference: A Comparison of Mixed-Race 
and Same-Gender Marriage, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 255, 262–88  (2002); Jane S. Schacter, The 
Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 283, 291–311 (1994); Rebecca Schatschneider, On Shifting Sand: The Perils of Grounding the 
Case for Same-Sex Marriage in the Context of Antimiscegenation, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 
285, 297–305 (2004); Mark Strasser, Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Antimiscege-
nation Analogy, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 981, 981 (1991); James Trosino, American Wedding: Same-
Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REV. 93, 108–16 (1993). But see Lynn D. 
Wardle & Lincoln C. Oliphant, In Praise of Loving: Reflections on the “Loving Analogy” for Same-
Sex Marriage, 51 HOW. L.J. 117, 153–64 (2007) (rejecting the analogy).  
 This Article takes a slightly different tack by showing how the arguments used by a Justice in the 
first U.S. Supreme Court case addressing same-sex marriage bans are the same arguments used to 
criminalize interracial marriage and, further, that these arguments are equally or more applicable to 
miscegenation laws than to DOMA. 
 19 On the significance of unanimous Supreme Court opinions addressing segregation, see Dennis 
J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948–1958, 68 
GEO. L.J. 1, 2 (1979). 
 20 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 396, 451 (1857); see ROBERT J. SICKELS, RACE, MARRIAGE AND THE 
LAW 92 (1972) (“In the Dred Scott case in 1857, notably, Chief Justice Roger Taney cited state miscege-
nation laws as evidence that Negroes were low in status and unfit for citizenship and the other privileges 
of whites . . . . ”) (citation omitted); Ian C. Bartrum, Religion and Race: The Ministerial Exception Reex-
amined, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 191, 198 (2011), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
lawreview/colloquy/2011/29/LRColl2011n29Bartrum.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/VQT4-LXT4 
(referring to “Taney’s unabashed bigotry” in Dred Scott); Justice Felix Frankfurter, Taney and the Com-
merce Clause, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1287 (1936) (noting characterization of “Taney, the bigoted 
provincial and protector of slavery”); see also David Snyder, Chief Justice Taney Hailed as a Hero, Re-
viled as a Bigot; Historical Society to Revisit Life of Author of Dred Scott Decision, WASH. POST, Oct. 
26, 2003, at C5. 
 21 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2711–14 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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sial issues;22 (2) the Constitution is silent on same-sex marriage;23 (3) the Court 
should not interfere with states’ right to determine marriage laws;24 (4) there is no 
deep-rooted tradition of same-sex marriage;25 and (5) the long-term consequences 
of same-sex marriage are unknown.26 This Article proceeds in five parts, one de-
voted to each of Justice Alito’s arguments, in order to show that each of his rea-
sons for upholding DOMA applies equally or more strongly to miscegenation 
laws at the time of the Loving opinion than to DOMA in 2013. 
Justice Alito’s Windsor dissent is most striking for what is missing from his 
list of arguments—a legitimate government interest in affirmatively denying fed-
eral recognition of valid state marriages between same-sex couples. Section 3 of 
DOMA discriminates both on the basis of sex and sexual orientation.27 Under 
intermediate scrutiny, the government must show that the challenged restrictions 
‘“are substantially related to a legitimate state interest.’”28 Under rational basis 
review, “a statutory classification must be rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose.”29 Thus, whether a reviewing court applies intermediate scru-
tiny or rational basis review, proof of at least a “legitimate governmental purpose” 
is necessary to uphold a law challenged on Equal Protection grounds. None of 
Justice Alito’s arguments articulates a government purpose in enacting DOMA in 
the first place. This omission is important because the Windsor majority specifi-
cally noted the absence of a legitimate government interest. 30 That alone suggests 
the Windsor defense is inherently deficient. 
Demonstrating the similarity of reasoning between Justice Alito’s opinion 
in Windsor and the segregationists who supported bans on interracial marriage 
does not necessarily imply that Justice Alito today would support miscegenation 
                                                                                                                           
 22 Id. at 2711; see infra notes 32–109 and accompanying text. 
 23 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2714; see infra notes 110–144 and accompanying text. 
 24 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2715; see infra notes 145–194 and accompanying text. 
 25 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2715; see infra notes 195–247 and accompanying text. 
 26 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2715; see infra notes 248–270 and accompanying text. 
 27 See Leslie, supra note 13, at 1131.  
 28 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985) (quoting Mills v. 
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982)); see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (noting 
that under intermediate scrutiny, “[t]he burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the 
State”). 
 29 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
 30 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (“The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose over-
comes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, 
sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”); cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996) 
(“[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the 
very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legiti-
mate governmental interest.” (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973))). In 
his Windsor dissent, Justice Scalia suggested that the need for a “uniform federal definition of mar-
riage” represented a legitimate government interest. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). But Justice Alito did not join Justice Scalia’s dissent, effectively leaving Justice Alito defending 
a discriminatory law without any purpose but to discriminate. 
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laws. Rather, it suggests that if Justice Alito had espoused the same reasoning in 
1967, it would have been as a dissent in Loving v. Virginia. It would have been 
intellectually inconsistent to join the Loving majority while arguing that the Su-
preme Court should not weigh in on controversial issues, should rely on consti-
tutional silence to avoid extending rights to non-traditional couples, should defer 
to state legislatures, should not overturn laws that had been in existence for hun-
dreds of years, and should let the prospect of unknown consequences prevent the 
legal recognition of non-traditional couples. This Article does not argue that Jus-
tice Alito supports—or ever would have supported—miscegenation laws. Ra-
ther, it views Justice Alito’s dissent through the lens of Loving in order to 
demonstrate the hollowness of the arguments employed against marriage equali-
ty for same-sex couples. 
In sum, there is no internally consistent way to defend DOMA with Justice 
Alito’s arguments without also upholding the constitutionality of miscegenation 
laws. Justice Alito not only authored a dissent for the Windsor case; he effectively 
wrote a dissent in Loving nearly fifty years after the case was decided. His dissent 
would require the upholding of Virginia’s miscegenation statute, as well as the 
criminal statutes in a dozen other states that in 1967 forbade interracial marriage. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that Justice Alito drafted the opinion for a future 
case that challenges the constitutionality of state bans on same-sex marriage. To 
the extent that the legal community now recognizes that the former anti-
miscegenation regimes represent a shameful chapter of American history, the fact 
that the same arguments used to defend miscegenation laws are being invoked to 
justify bans on same-sex marriage suggests that such bans are inherently suspect 
and probably unconstitutional.31 
I. THE CONTROVERSIES OVER MARRIAGE RESTRICTIONS 
Justice Alito began his 2013 dissent in United States v. Windsor by noting 
that the subject at hand was controversial, describing the country as “engaged in 
a heated debate about same-sex marriage.”32 He then chastised Edith Windsor 
and the U.S. Department of Justice for “really seeking to have the Court resolve 
a debate between two competing views of marriage.”33 Justice Alito thus implied 
                                                                                                                           
 31 Over two decades before Windsor, Professor Mark Strasser observed: “If jurists and theorists 
are concerned about their own integrity and credibility, they must refrain from employing the kinds of 
arguments that were used to justify the refusal to recognize interracial marriages.” Strasser, supra note 
18, at 989. 
 32 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2711 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“That debate is, at bottom, about the nature 
of the institution of marriage.”). 
 33 Id. at 2718. 
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that the Court should avoid current topics that divide the nation, such as mar-
riage equality for same-sex couples.34 
This Part argues that Justice Alito’s assertion that controversy compels up-
holding marriage restrictions against constitutional challenge would have com-
pelled him to dissent in Loving v. Virginia, had he been on the Court. First, this 
Part explores the trajectory of the controversy over miscegenation laws, focusing 
on religion, social attitudes, and prominent civil rights groups. It then discusses 
the Supreme Court’s avoidance of the issue of interracial marriage through the 
1950s and most of the 1960s. Given these historical overviews, this Part finally 
argues that Justice Alito’s argument that the Supreme Court should avoid contro-
versial issues applies more to the case of Loving than to Windsor. 
The issue of interracial marriage has been enduringly controversial 
throughout American history. In the mid-1800s, French author Auguste Carlier 
observed in his book, Marriage in the United States, that “the force of prejudice” 
against interracial marriage between black and white was so great that “‘no one 
would dare to brave it. It is not the legal penalty which is feared, but a condem-
                                                                                                                           
 34 Scholars have argued that jurists are wise to avoid controversial issues. Entering the sphere of 
public debate can undermine the legitimacy of the judiciary. The debate over whether the Supreme 
Court should avoid controversial issues predates the Court’s Loving opinion. Compare Alexander 
Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 79 
(1961) (analyzing what the Court should take into consideration when deciding whether to adjudicate 
and concluding that there is a “wide area of choice open to the Court in deciding whether, when, and 
how much to adjudicate”), with Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the ‘Passive Virtues’—A Com-
ment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (1964) (arguing that 
Bickel’s thesis should not be accepted uncritically and that the Court has “an obligation to decide in 
some cases”). 
 The controversy-avoidance argument has been employed extensively in gay rights litigation. For 
example, Justice Scalia lamented in Romer v. Evans—which invalidated Colorado’s prohibition on 
gay-inclusive anti-discrimination laws—and Lawrence v. Texas—which invalidated sodomy laws—
that whenever the Court condemns discrimination against gay Americans that the Court is improperly 
taking sides in a culture war. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I 
think it no business of the courts (as opposed to the political branches) to take sides in this culture 
war.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is clear from this that 
the Court has taken sides in the culture war . . . . ”). Justice Scalia—like Justice Alito in Windsor—
apparently failed to appreciate that conservative justices are also taking sides in the culture war over 
equality for gay citizens; they are simply choosing the side against equality. 
 One might argue that conservative justices are trying to protect the Court’s legitimacy by defer-
ring to legislative bodies when the challenged law’s subject leads to “heated debate.” That would 
explain Justice Scalia’s decision to uphold Colorado’s anti-gay Amendment 2 in Romer, anti-gay 
sodomy laws in Lawrence, and the anti-gay DOMA in Windsor, the latter of which Justice Alito de-
fended. (Justice Alito was not on the Court for Romer or Lawrence.) The avoiding-controversy theory 
is not particularly persuasive because Justice Scalia had no difficulty striking down controversial 
applications of laws that protected gay Americans, such as anti-discrimination laws in Massachusetts 
and New Jersey that would have facilitated gay participation in public parades and the Boy Scouts, 
respectively. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 559 
(1995); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000). The only consistency in this “avoiding 
controversy” philosophy is that gay Americans lose—always. 
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nation a thousand times more terrible.’”35 Most Americans believed that interra-
cial intimacy violated God’s law, which they interpreted as mandating the sepa-
ration of the races in schools, swimming pools, and bedrooms. 
Separatist views found voice most outspokenly in southern Protestant the-
ology. Judges invoked “the white southern Protestant theology of race to justify 
antimiscegenation laws.”36 For example, Virginia’s Supreme Court upheld that 
state’s miscegenation law in 1878, asserting that the “two distinct races . . . 
should be kept distinct and separate, and that connections and alliances so un-
natural that God and nature seem to forbid them, should be prohibited by posi-
tive law, and be subject to no evasion.”37 This philosophy, however, extended 
beyond southern states. For example, in 1871 in State v. Gibson, the Supreme 
Court of Indiana held that neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Civil 
Rights Bill of 1875 affected the power of the state to criminalize interracial mar-
riage because marriage “is a public institution established by God himself, is 
recognized in all Christian and civilized nations, and is essential to the peace, 
happiness, and well-being of society.”38 The court opined: 
Why the Creator made one black and the other white, we do not 
know, but the fact is apparent, and the races are distinct, each produc-
ing its own kind, and following the peculiar law of its constitution. 
Conceding equality, with natures as perfect, and rights as sacred, yet 
God has made them dissimilar, with those natural instincts and feel-
ings which He always imparts to His creatures, when He intends that 
they shall not overstep the natural boundaries He has assigned to 
them. The natural law which forbids their intermarriage and that so-
cial amalgamation which leads to a corruption of races, is as clearly 
divine as that which imparted to them different natures. The tendency 
of intimate social intermixture is to amalgamation, contrary to the law 
of races.39 
Because Catholic doctrine was relatively more accepting of interracial mar-
riage, some southern Protestants openly condemned the Catholic Church for not 
                                                                                                                           
 35 COTT, supra note 2, at 42 (quoting AUGUSTE CARLIER, MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 87 
(Joy Jeffries, trans., Arno Press 1972) (1867)). 
 36 FAY BOTHAM, ALMIGHTY GOD CREATED THE RACES: CHRISTIANITY, INTERRACIAL MAR-
RIAGE & AMERICAN LAW 137 (2009) (citing Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. 287, 296 (1871), which referred 
to members of an interracial couple having a “distinction between them in race and color, made by 
nature”). In contrast, many black churches vocally opposed miscegenation laws. CHARLES FRANK 
ROBINSON II, DANGEROUS LIAISONS: SEX AND LOVE IN THE SEGREGATED SOUTH 117 (2003) 
(“Black ministers also demonstrated their opposition to anti-miscegenation laws by performing the 
marriages of interracial couples.”). 
 37 Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858, 869 (1878). 
 38 36 Ind. 389, 402–03 (1871). 
 39 Id. at 404. 
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sufficiently separating the races. Most notably, in the aftermath of an interracial 
wedding held at a New York City Catholic parish, Alabama Senator Thomas J. 
Heflin in 1930 made a speech to Congress publicly condemning both the Catho-
lic Church and New York public officials for not preventing the marriage from 
taking place.40 He railed: “The fact . . . that the Roman Catholic Church permits 
negroes and whites to belong to the same Catholic Church and to go to the same 
Catholic schools and permits and sanctions the marriage between whites and 
negroes in the United States is largely responsible for the loose, dangerous, and 
sickening conditions that exist in New York City and State to-day.”41 
Even though the Catholic Church was more enlightened in its views about 
interracial marriage than many southern Protestant churches, the issue of misce-
genation laws still proved controversial even among Catholics.42 Many decision-
makers within the Catholic Church affirmatively declined to challenge miscege-
nation laws because they were “‘not at all willing to be pulled into a controversy 
of this kind.’”43 Thus, many high officials in the Church were upset when they 
were unwillingly dragged into the spotlight on the issue in California. When Dan 
Marshall challenged California’s miscegenation law in the 1940s in Perez, he 
made a religious freedom argument based on the fact that Perez and Davis were 
Catholics who sought to exercise their right to enter the sacrament of marriage, 
which their religion did not limit to same-race couples.44 Although Catholic doc-
trine did not prohibit miscegenation, “[a]t the Los Angeles Diocese, Catholic 
officials were appalled that Marshall had put the Catholic Church in the position 
of seeming to endorse interracial marriage.”45 In response to Marshall’s request 
that Auxiliary Bishop Joseph McGucken testify about church doctrine in the Pe-
rez case, McGucken refused, stating “‘I cannot think of any point in existing race 
relationships that will stir up more passion and prejudice . . . . I want to make 
very clear that I am not at all willing to be pulled into a controversy of this 
kind.’”46 Ultimately, Marshall pursued the litigation against the strong wishes of 
                                                                                                                           
 40 BOTHAM, supra note 36, at 127 (“[T]he Senator berated New York’s Governor Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Senator Royal Samuel Copeland, Alfred E. Smith, and New York City’s Irish Catholic 
mayor, Jimmy Walker.”). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 120 (“[T]he church’s theologies of marriage and race implicitly—and sometimes explicit-
ly—tolerated interracial marriage, but given the volatility of the issue, this was not a position the 
American bishops would openly support until the 1960s with Loving v. Virginia.”). Some Catholic 
organizations, as well as prominent Protestants, supported the Lovings’ challenge. Id. at 128 (“And 
finally, a coalition of southern bishops and two Catholic organizations joined together in 1966 to ad-
vocate the legality of the marriage between Richard and Mildred Loving of Virginia.”). 
 43 Id. at 21 (citation omitted). 
 44 See 198 P.2d 17, 18 (Cal. 1948); PASCOE, supra note 2, at 211 (“Because California miscege-
nation law prevented Perez and Davis from exercising their right ‘to participate fully in the sacramen-
tal life of the religion in which they believe,’ it was an unconstitutional restraint on their freedom of 
religion.”) (citation omitted). 
 45 PASCOE, supra note 2, at 214. 
 46 Id. (citation omitted). 
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the Church’s hierarchy. Indeed, his decision to pursue the issue was “one of the 
factors that made [Marshall] persona non grata in the Chancery office about that 
time (1948) and from that time on.”47 Despite Marshall’s success, his decision to 
create a public controversy by challenging miscegenation laws as a Catholic of-
ficial was one of the factors that led to the end of the Catholic Interracial Coun-
cil.48 
Across the country, although many Catholic theologians had spoken about 
the canonical right of interracial couples to marry,49 the issue remained contro-
versial in many Catholic circles.50 Some Catholics resisted the official Catholic 
teachings permitting interracial marriage.51 Ultimately, it was a devout Catholic 
judge—Judge Leon Bazile—who rejected the Lovings’ challenge against Virgin-
ia’s miscegenation statute because, in Judge Bazile’s words: “‘Almighty God 
created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on 
separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there 
would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows 
that he did not intend for the races to mix.’”52 
Support of miscegenation laws ultimately transcended religion among most 
white Americans, who saw the issue as less a matter of politics than adherence to 
natural law.53 As such, they assigned great importance to the issue. Among Cau-
casian Americans, social scientist Gunnar Myrdal reported in 1944 that “‘the ban 
on intermarriage and other sex relations involving white women and colored 
                                                                                                                           
 47 BOTHAM, supra note 36, at 22. 
 48 Id. (“And although the Perez-Davis case was only one of His Excellency’s disagreements with 
the CIC, by publicly advocating the most intimate union of members of different races, and by forcing 
the church into the spotlight on this volatile issue, the CIC exemplified most strikingly [Archbishop] 
Mcintyre’s trepidations about interracialism.”). 
 49 Id. at 128 (“In an article in the Negro Digest in 1943, Monsignor John A. Ryan affirmed the 
canonical right of Catholic interracial couples to request that their parish priest marry them.”) (citation 
omitted); PETER WALLENSTEIN, TELL THE COURT I LOVE MY WIFE: RACE, MARRIAGE, AND LAW—
AN AMERICAN HISTORY 203 (2002) (“For example, the National Catholic Conference for Interracial 
Justice insisted at its annual meeting in 1963 that interracial marriage was entirely compatible with the 
doctrine and canon law of the Roman Catholic Church. ‘Diversity of faith’ was an impediment to 
marriage, in this view, but race and color were not.”). 
 50 PHYL NEWBECK, VIRGINIA HASN’T ALWAYS BEEN FOR LOVERS: INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE 
BANS AND THE CASE OF RICHARD AND MILDRED LOVING 78 (2004) (In his Perez dissent, Justice 
Shenk began with “an attack on the freedom of religion argument, quoting a Catholic priest who had 
written that, while the Church did not forbid interracial marriages, it asked its ministers to dissuade 
mixed couples from trying to wed in states where such unions were forbidden. Thus he suggested that 
the church was bound by local laws, not vice versa.” (citing 198 P.2d at 36 (Shenk, J., dissenting))). 
 51 BOTHAM, supra note 36, at 128 (“Moreover, just as some Catholics resisted Catholic doctrine, 
some white Protestants also resisted the southern theology of separate races.”). 
 52 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (quoting trial judge). 
 53 PASCOE, supra note 2, at 1 (“Between the 1860s and the 1960s, Americans saw their opposition 
to interracial marriage as a product of nature rather than a product of politics. The more natural oppo-
sition to interracial marriage seemed, the easier it was for it to serve as the bottom line of white su-
premacy and the most commonsense justification for all other forms of race discrimination.”). 
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men takes precedence before everything else.’”54 The societal condemnation of 
miscegenation presented itself in myriad ways. For example, the Hays Code, 
which Hollywood studios used as a voluntary—but strictly followed—form of 
self-regulation and self-censorship, prohibited movies from depicting either in-
terracial sex or marriage until 1956.55 The California Supreme Court’s repudia-
tion of that state’s miscegenation law did not compel a change in attitudes re-
garding interracial marriage across the nation. In the 1950s, over 92 percent of 
white Americans nationwide opposed interracial marriage; polls showed south-
ern opposition in excess of 99 percent.56 
In the black community, interracial marriage was sufficiently controversial 
that opinion was deeply divided over miscegenation laws. Just as many Cauca-
sian Americans supported miscegenation laws as facilitating so-called white ra-
cial purity, many African Americans opposed interracial marriage as interfering 
with black racial purity.57 Marcus Garvey championed this position.58 Garvey 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Id. at 192 (citing GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND 
MODERN DEMOCRACY 587 (1944)); see id. (noting that “miscegenation laws had become politically 
untouchable in the South”). 
 55 Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY REV. 
LESBIAN & GAY LEGAL ISSUES 9, 14–15 (1991) (citing EDWARD DE GRAZIA & ROGER K. NEWMAN, 
BANNED FILMS: MOVIES, CENSORS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 92 (1982)). So controversial was 
the issue that after commissioning an essay from Harrah Arendt on school integration in the late 
1950s, the editors of Commentary refused to let her discuss miscegenation laws. David A. Hollinger, 
Amalgamation and Hypodescent: The Question of Ethnoracial Mixture in the History of the United 
States, 108 AM. HISTORICAL REV. 1363, 1363 (2003). 
 56 KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 85 (“According to Mydral, ‘even a [white] liberal-minded North-
erner of cosmopolitan culture and with a minimum of conventional blinds will, in nine cases out of 
ten, express a definite feeling against amalgamation.’” (quoting MYRDAL, supra note 54, at 57)); id. at 
88 (“To most white Americans, interracial marriage was a bizarre heresy that generated both curiosity 
and abhorrence. In a 1958 Gallup poll—the first in which Gallup gauged public opinion regarding 
interracial marriage—only 4 percent of whites questioned approved of marriage between blacks and 
whites. In the South, 99 percent of whites disapproved.” (citing Renée Christine Romano, Crossing 
the Race Line: Black-White Interracial Marriage in the United States, 1945-1990, at 21 (1996) (Ph.D. 
diss., Stanford Univ.))); PASCOE, supra note 2, at 206–07 (citing opinion polls from the 1950s). Pro-
fessor Jane Schacter has questioned the utility of the 1958 Gallup poll. Jane S. Schacter, Courts and 
the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation, Then and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1181 
(2009) (“A second limitation of the 1958 Gallup poll relates to what it measured. The poll asked re-
spondents if they approved of interracial marriage, as opposed to whether they favored a legal ban on 
it.”). 
 57 KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 26 (“In fact, substantial numbers of blacks have always been hostile 
to interracial marriage, viewing black participants in such matches as racial defectors.”); PASCOE, 
supra note 2, at 183. One scholar noted: 
The NAACP increasingly had to worry about Black Americans, too. The group was 
well aware that many, perhaps most, Blacks opposed interracial marriage, and it had 
expected they would be reluctant to take a public stand against miscegenation laws. It 
was, however, entirely unprepared for the possibility that Blacks might actually support 
miscegenation laws. Yet this was the prospect that arose in the mid-1920s, when a 
growing number of African Americans responded to the surging political power of calls 
for white racial purity by advancing an offsetting program of black racial purity. 
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and his organization Universal Negro Improvement Association (“UNIA”) 
waged battle against the NAACP for the hearts and minds of African Americans. 
Garvey drew a stark contrast between the two groups on the issue of miscegena-
tion laws. He condemned the NAACP as a “Miscegenationist organization”59 in 
contrast to the UNIA, which according to Garvey stood “in opposition to [the 
NAACP] on the miscegenation question, because we believe in the racial purity 
of both the Negro and white races.”60 Not only did Garvey approve of miscege-
nation laws,61 in 1925 his wife informed reporters at her appearance at the Vir-
ginia Bureau of Vital Statistics that Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law had “the 
support of millions of negroes throughout the country.”62 
Fearing failure, the establishment civil rights organizations refrained from 
participating in court challenges against miscegenation laws.63 Although by the 
time of Loving the NAACP had outlived the UNIA to become the nation’s domi-
nant civil rights organization for racial equality, the NAACP avoided court chal-
lenges against miscegenation laws for most of the twentieth century because the 
issue was too controversial. Despite their personal opposition to miscegenation 
laws, the leaders of the NAACP knew that legislators and judges largely sup-
ported the laws and that America’s black population was divided on the issue.64 
The NAACP lawyers were keenly aware that “the white South was insane on the 
                                                                                                                           
PASCOE, supra note 2, at 183. For example, Frederick Douglass’ marriage to a white woman caused a 
backlash from many black Americans who had previously revered the man. See KENNEDY, supra note 
2, at 73 (“A dispatch published in a black-owned newspaper aptly captures the tenor of the hurt: ‘Fred 
Douglass has married a red-head white girl . . . . Goodbye, black blood in that family. We have no 
further use for him. His picture hangs in our parlor, we will hang it in the stables.’” (quoting WILLIAM 
S. MCFEELY, FREDERICK DOUGLASS 320 (1991))). 
 58 PASCOE, supra note 2, at 183 (describing Marcus Garvey’s attempts to convince African-
Americans to support miscegenation laws). 
 59 Id.  
 60 Id. (citing Marcus Garvey, Essays on Racial Purity by Marcus Garvey, in THE MARCUS GAR-
VEY AND UNIVERSAL NEGRO IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION PAPERS 216, 219 (Robert A. Hill ed., 
1989)). 
 61 PASCOE, supra note 2, at 184. 
 62 Id. Many African Americans opposed both miscegenation and laws to prohibit it. For example, 
W. E. B. Du Bois, supported neither interracial marriage nor bans against it because the latter “provid-
ed a ‘magna charta of concubinage and bastardy’ to white men, giving them license to exploit black 
women sexually without feeling any obligation.” COTT, supra note 2, at 164; see also KENNEDY, 
supra note 2, at 110 (“While black opposition to intermarriage has always been a powerful and con-
stant undercurrent, it was largely suppressed prior to the mid-1960s in order to accentuate protest 
against antimiscegenation laws, which most black enemies of mixed marriage also opposed.”). In the 
early 20th century, the NAACP walked a fine line of opposing miscegenation laws while explaining 
“that the NAACP’s opposition was in no sense tantamount to advocacy in favor of intermarriage. This 
is an important point.” KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 257. 
 63 KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 214 (“Afterward, the liberal magazine The Nation would account 
for their absence by reporting that ‘most of the civil-rights organizations failed or refused to partici-
pate in the case on the assumption that miscegenation statutes could not be successfully challenged in 
the courts.’” (quoting The Shape of Things, NATION, Oct. 16, 1948, at 415)). 
 64 PASCOE, supra note 2, at 192–93. 
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issue—Northern attitudes weren’t very rational either.”65 Perceiving a low like-
lihood of success, the NAACP initiated no litigation to invalidate any state mis-
cegenation laws during the 1930s and 1940s.66 Neither would they participate in 
others’ legal challenges; for example, neither the NAACP nor the ACLU would 
publicly support—let alone file an amicus brief in—the Perez litigation.67  
Yet even after the Perez decision showed that some judges were willing to 
invalidate miscegenation laws as unconstitutional, the NAACP (and its Legal 
Defense Fund (“LDF”)) did not join other legal challenges against interracial 
marriage bans.68 For example, in the 1950s, the NAACP left the ACLU and the 
Japanese American Citizens League (“JACL”) to attack Virginia’s miscegenation 
law without assistance from the leading civil rights organization devoted to ra-
cial justice.69 Focused on racial segregation in public schools, “the NAACP 
feared that any attempt to raise the volatile issue of interracial marriage might 
derail the campaign against segregation in the schools.”70 Even legal strategist 
Thurgood Marshall “worried that every attempt to raise the question of interra-
cial marriage would endanger the LDF’s entire campaign against segregation 
just as it was finally coming to fruition.”71 The NAACP had reason to be con-
                                                                                                                           
 65 JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS 
FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 71–72 (1994). 
 66 PASCOE, supra note 2, at 192–93. The ACLU, which also opposed miscegenation laws, de-
ferred to the NAACP’s prerogative not to bring any litigation on the matter in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Id. (citing SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU 60 
(2d ed. 1999)). 
 67 Id. at 214. 
 68 NEWBECK, supra note 50, at 109 (“In September 1955, Executive Secretary Roy Wilkins went 
so far as to say that the organization took no stance on the issue of interracial marriage.” (citing Greg-
ory Michael Dorr, Principled Expediency: Eugenics, Naim v. Naim, and the Supreme Court, 42 AM. 
J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 147 n.121 (1998))). 
 69 PASCOE, supra note 2, at 206 (discussing the Virginia Supreme Court’s 1955 decision in Naim 
v. Naim). 
 70 Id. at 223; Julie Novkov, The Miscegenation/Same-Sex Marriage Analogy: What Can We 
Learn from Legal History?, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 345, 354 (2008) (“While the NAACP had other 
agendas besides challenging state-sponsored segregation, tackling punitive state regulation of interra-
cial intimacy appeared unwise to most NAACP elites. They feared both that they would fail and that 
the volatile nature of racist emotions around interracial sex would provoke mobilization, threatening 
other pieces of their overarching legal strategy.”). 
 71 PASCOE, supra note 2, at 204. Thurgood Marshall shrewdly avoided the controversy of misce-
genation laws throughout his career. When Senator Thurmond—a supporter of miscegenation laws—
asked Thurgood Marshall during his Supreme Court confirmation hearings whether the nominee knew 
of any evidence that “contradicted the historical evidence of the Commonwealth of Virginia that the 
14th Amendment was not intended to affect antimiscegenation laws,” Marshall responded that he was 
“not familiar with the case. I am only familiar with the opinion. I did not read the record in that case.” 
SICKELS, supra note 20, at 5 (quoting The Nomination of Thurgood Marshall to the Supreme Court, 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 175 (1967) (statement of Thurgood Mar-
shall)); see also NEWBECK, supra note 50, at 90 (“Although the NAACP later became seriously in-
volved in overturning antimiscegenation laws in the 1960s, during the 1950s, its attitude can best be 
described as one of ‘firm abstention.’ . . . . In 1944 Thurgood Marshall, then the lead attorney for the 
NAACP, actually urged the ACLU not to challenge antimiscegenation laws.”). 
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cerned given that its victory in Brown v. Board of Education proved controver-
sial in large part because segregationists viewed the decision as a step toward 
miscegenation.72 For example, following the Brown opinion, the Jackson, Mis-
sissippi Daily News feared that “White and Negro children in the same schools 
will lead to miscegenation.”73 Georgia Governor Herman Talmadge condemned 
the Brown decision as leading to “‘the mongrelization of the races.’”74 The hos-
tile responses to racial equality meant that the NAACP had to prioritize its goals; 
consequently, issues of education, voting rights, and criminal justice reform 
trumped the more controversial issue of interracial marriage.75 
The issue of miscegenation laws was sufficiently controversial that the Su-
preme Court repeatedly ducked the issue throughout the 1950s and most of the 
1960s. In 1954 in Jackson v. State, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of that state’s miscegenation law while affirming Linnie Jackson’s 
criminal conviction for violating the statute.76 She was sentenced to the Alabama 
penitentiary.77 When Jackson’s lawyer petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for 
certiorari, most of the Justices opposed the petition, largely out of concern that 
addressing the issue of miscegenation laws could magnify southern resistance to 
the Court’s invalidation of public school segregation in its recently issued Brown 
opinion.78  
                                                                                                                           
 72 See KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 24–25. 
 73 BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 204 (Waldo E. Mar-
tin Jr. ed., 1998) (quoting Bloodstains on White Marble Steps, DAILY NEWS, (Jackson, Miss.), May 
18, 1954)); see PASCOE, supra note 2, at 225 (citation omitted); see also KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 
24–25; PASCOE, supra note 2, at 225 (“[D]ie hard White racists, who were horrified by Brown, orga-
nized themselves to resist, issuing incendiary pronouncements that integration in the schools was only 
the first step on the road to a world of miscegenation run amok.”). Such slippery slope arguments 
against miscegenation were common. For example, courts also argued that society must have segre-
gated railcars in order to prevent miscegenation. See NEWBECK, supra note 50, at 25. In 1841, Ohio 
legislators feared that allowing blacks to testify in court against whites “‘[w]ill tend to an equality of 
the races, and promote their intermarriage.’” Id. at 41 (citation omitted). 
 74 WALLENSTEIN, supra note 49, at 205 (citing JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDU-
CATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY, at xix (2001). 
 75 KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 25; see id. at 25 n.* (quoting CLOYTE M. LARSSON, MARRIAGE 
ACROSS THE COLOR LINE, at vii (1965), for the explanation of black priorities in the 1960s: “‘Defend 
interracial marriage on principle! Principle costs too much. . . . First things do come first. Survival 
comes first. Food. Clothing. Jobs. Shelter. Recreation. Creature comforts. But interracial marriage? 
That is for the few. The very few.”) 
 76 72 So. 2d 116, 116 (1954). 
 77 WALLENSTEIN, supra note 49, at 179. 
 78 PASCOE, supra note 2, at 226. As one scholar noted: 
Everyone at the Court, even the law clerks, regarded the case as political dynamite, 
likely to add fuel to the fires of resistance. Three Justices voted to hear the case any-
way, but the rest were content to dispose of the matter by simply refusing, as the Court 
can (and often does, in responding to petitions for certiorari like that offered in Jack-
son), to grant the petition for review. 
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The following year, the U.S. Supreme Court again faced the issue of mis-
cegenation laws. In 1955 in Naim v. Naim, the Supreme Court of Virginia again 
upheld that state’s miscegenation law.79 Unlike Jackson, however, the losing side 
in Naim brought its case to the U.S. Supreme Court via appeal, not certiorari.80 
This made it harder for the Justices to avoid the case. The easiest way to dodge 
any ruling on the merits would have been to dismiss the case for lack of a sub-
stantial federal question.81 Court records show that the law clerks concluded that 
this approach lacked credibility.82 Worried that a ruling against miscegenation 
laws could “‘thwart[] or seriously handicap[] the enforcement of . . . the [school] 
segregation cases,’” Justice Frankfurter initially advocated that the Court decline 
to entertain the Naim case by claiming “‘that the issue has not reached that com-
pelling demand for consideration which precludes refusal to consider it.’”83 
While the justices struggled with how to deal with the Naim appeal, Justices 
Clark and Frankfurter drafted a per curiam opinion that vacated and remanded 
the case based on “[t]he inadequacy of the record as to the relationship of the 
parties to the Commonwealth of Virginia at the time of the marriage in North 
Carolina and upon their return to Virginia, and the failure of the parties to bring 
here all questions relevant to the disposition of the case . . . . ”84 Holes in the 
record, the Justices asserted, “prevent[ed] the constitutional issue of the validity 
of the Virginia statute on miscegenation tendered here being considered ‘in 
clean-cut and concrete form, unclouded’ by such problems.”85 By a vote of 7 to 
2, a majority of Justices voted to support the per curium opinion to remand the 
                                                                                                                           
Id.; see also Schacter, supra note 56, at 1156 (citing NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE 
RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950S, at 67–81 (La. Paperback ed. 
1999)) (noting “massive resistance” to the Brown decision). Stanford constitutional law professor 
Gerald Gunther, who clerked for Chief Justice Warren at the time, later described the denial of certio-
rari in Jackson as “‘totally prudential, totally based on a high-level political judgment.’” ED CRAY, 
CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 450 (1997) (quoting interview with Gerald Gun-
ther). 
 Chief Justice Warren, along with Justice Hugo Black and Justice William O. Douglas, had voted 
to hear the case. Justice Douglas’s law clerk, Harvey M. Grossman, advised his boss that taking the 
case “would probably increase the tensions growing out of the school segregation cases and perhaps 
impede solution to that problem,” but the serious deprivation of rights involved warranted the Court 
taking action. WALLENSTEIN, supra note 49, at 180. 
 79 87 S.E.2d at 756; see SICKELS, supra note 20, at 3 (describing Jackson as “an ideal test case for 
the opponents of antimiscegenation legislation because the question of constitutionality had been 
squarely presented in appeals within the state and rejected by the judges of Alabama”). 
 80 See NEWBECK, supra note 50, at 109–11 (discussing lawyers’ decision in Naim regarding 
whether to bring appeal or to petition for certiorari). 
 81 This is how the U.S. Supreme Court avoided the issue of same-sex marriage bans in 1971. 
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971). 
 82 PASCOE, supra note 2, at 230 (footnote omitted). 
 83 Id.; see WALLENSTEIN, supra note 49, at 182 (discussing Justice Frankfurter’s “tortured 
prose”). 
 84 Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891, 891 (1955) (per curiam). 
 85 Id. (quoting Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549, 584 (1947)). 
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case to develop the factual record instead of hearing oral argument and issuing a 
ruling on the constitutionality of miscegenation laws.86 
Upon receiving the Naim case back on its docket, the Virginia Supreme 
Court refused to remand the case to the lower state court, asserting that—despite 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s per curium opinion—the record was already adequate 
to decide the relevant issues.87 As a result, Virginia’s miscegenation law re-
mained in place. Virginia’s newspapers cheered their high court’s defiance.88 
When the Virginia Supreme Court declined to follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
instructions, the losing party again appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. This 
time, instead of enforcing its own previous opinion, the Justices again declined 
to hear the case, issuing a new per curium opinion stating that the action of the 
Virginia Supreme Court “leaves the case devoid of a properly presented federal 
question.”89 Scholars have characterized this as an “absurd fictitious ground.”90 
Chief Justice Warren himself condemned his fellow Justices’ approach in Naim 
as “total bullshit.”91 However characterized, these maneuvers allowed the Justic-
es to achieve their goal of avoiding any substantive ruling on the constitutionali-
ty of race-based marriage laws because they were so controversial.92 
                                                                                                                           
 86 PASCOE, supra note 2, at 230–31. 
 87 Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E.2d 849, 850 (Va. 1956). 
 88 KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 271 (“Newspapers in Virginia lauded the actions of the state su-
preme court.”); MORAN, supra note 9, at 90 (quoting Virginia’s Top Tribunal Rejects Order of U.S. 
Supreme Court, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 19, 1956, at 12) (“Applauding this act of defiance, 
the Richmond Times-Dispatch commended the Virginia court for rebuffing the Justices in an ‘area of 
State affairs over which [the U.S. Supreme Court] has no jurisdiction.’”); see also WALLENSTEIN, 
supra note 49, at 183 (quoting Virginia’s Top Tribunal Rejects Order of U.S. Supreme Court, supra) 
(“Noting ‘many’ Virginians’ ‘displeasure’ with the Supreme Court’s recent rulings on public school 
segregation, the [Richmond Times-Dispatch] editorial observed that those ‘many Virginians . . . also 
applaud the Virginia court in rebuffing the Federal court’s attempt to operate in an area of State affairs 
over which it has no jurisdiction.’”).  
 89 Naim,350 U.S. at 985. Peggy Pascoe notes that “Chief Justice Earl Warren . . . drafted—and 
then, at the last minute, withdrew—a stinging dissent chiding his colleagues for a decision he regarded 
as ‘completely impermissible in view of this Court’s obligatory jurisdiction.’” PASCOE, supra note 2, 
at 231; BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT—A JUDICIAL 
BIOGRAPHY 161 (1994). 
 90 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 72 (2000). 
 91 MORAN, supra note 9, at 90. 
 92 The Court’s refusal to actively engage in either Jackson or Naim illustrated the intensity of the 
controversy and “reflected the court’s conservative strategy on highly emotional and sensitive issues.” 
ROBINSON, supra note 36, at 136; see KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 270 (noting that in light of Brown, 
“the same justices worried that it might be imprudent to consider Naim, which might well result in the 
majority striking down racial segregation at the altar. One unidentified justice reportedly remarked, 
‘One bombshell at a time is enough.’” (quoting WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL 
STRATEGY 193 (1964))); WALLENSTEIN, supra note 49, at 284 n.31 (“The refusal to take the Jackson 
and Naim cases reflected less an inclination to uphold the antimiscegenation regime than a strong 
sense that the time was inauspicious for throwing out the ancient laws[.]”); WALLENSTEIN, supra note 
49, at 182 (“Justice Harold M. Burton’s law clerk struck much the same tone: ‘In view of the difficul-
ties engendered by the segregation cases it would be wise judicial policy to duck this question for a 
time.’”). 
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The Court’s decision to evade the issue mirrored the strategies of other pub-
lic and private organizations. For example, the issue was sufficiently controver-
sial that the Department of Justice refused to contribute an amicus brief in Naim 
in opposition to miscegenation laws, although it had submitted an anti-
segregation amicus brief in Brown.93 The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) also 
counseled against pursuing the case to the Supreme Court, reasoning that in light 
of outcry created by the Brown opinion, “‘this is not the time to push the Su-
preme Court for a decision on the validity of miscegenation statutes.’”94 The 
ADL lawyers worried that the negative response to Brown in the South might 
lead the Justices to find miscegenation laws constitutional.95 
The Court again ducked the issue of miscegenation laws a full decade after 
the Brown opinion had been issued. In 1964, in McLaughlin v. Florida,96 the 
U.S. Supreme Court heard a constitutional challenge to a Florida statute that 
punished interracial cohabitation by imprisonment.97 The Supreme Court held 
that because the Florida statute made criminality dependent on race,98 the law 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. When the 
State of Florida claimed that its race-based anti-cohabitation law was a necessary 
part of the State’s overall anti-miscegenation regime, the Supreme Court rejected 
this argument while declining to “reach[] the question of the validity of the 
State’s prohibition against interracial marriage.”99 Although the McLaughlin de-
cision could be seen as laying the groundwork for the eventual invalidation of 
state miscegenation laws, because McLaughlin avoided the issue, state courts 
continued to uphold the constitutionality of interracial marriage bans after 
McLaughlin.100 
When the Supreme Court eventually proved willing to tackle the issue and 
ruled miscegenation laws unconstitutional in Loving, the Court’s decision 
marked a turning point in the controversy over miscegenation laws.101 Nonethe-
                                                                                                                           
 93 PASCOE, supra note 2, at 229. 
 94 Id. (citation omitted). 
 95 Id. 
 96 379 U.S. 184, 184 (1964). 
 97 Id. at 184 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.05 (repealed 1969)). 
 98 The Florida statute punished by imprisonment “‘[a]ny negro man and white woman, or any 
white man and negro woman, who are not married to each other, who shall habitually live in and oc-
cupy in the nighttime the same room . . . . ’” Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.05 (repealed 1969)). 
 99 Id. at 195; see also MORAN, supra note 9, at 93 (“[R]enowned constitutional law scholar Alex-
ander Bickel urged the Justices to confine themselves to the cohabitation issue and not to create a 
controversy over the validity of interracial marriage, ‘an issue that is, after all, hardly of central im-
portance in the civil rights struggle.’”) (citation omitted). 
 100 See Hibbert v. Mudd, 187 So. 2d 503, 508 (La. Ct. App. 1966); Jones v. Lorenzen, 441 P.2d 
986, 990 (Okla. 1965). 
 101 By the time that the Loving litigation reached the Supreme Court, more civil rights organiza-
tions were prepared to publicly challenge the constitutionality of miscegenation laws. For example, 
the NAACP contributed an amicus brief, as did the Japanese American Citizens League and a collec-
tion of religious leaders. See SICKELS, supra note 20, at 85 (“The American Civil Liberties Union, 
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less, some controversy continued after the Court announced its Loving decision. 
For example, although the southern response to Loving was largely tepid,102 
many southern states refused to repeal their miscegenation laws for decades. De-
spite the Court’s decision in Loving, many jurisdictions continued to enforce 
their anti-miscegenation regimes and to refuse to marry interracial couples, who 
had to seek federal court orders to marriage licenses.103 
Justice Alito’s invocation of controversy as a reason to avoid striking down 
a marriage prohibition applies more strongly to miscegenation laws in the 1960s 
than to DOMA in 2013. Miscegenation laws were bolstered by overwhelming 
support when the Court was considering whether the Lovings had a constitution-
al right to marry. Interracial marriage was more controversial among the public 
in the 1960s than same-sex marriage was in 2013.104 In fact, a majority of Amer-
icans did not support interracial marriage until three decades after the Loving 
opinion.105 By comparison, a majority of Americans nationwide voiced support 
for same-sex marriage in February of 2014,106 a mere eight months after the 
                                                                                                                           
various Catholic organizations acting together, the Japanese American Citizens League, the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund came to the assistance of the Lovings.”). 
 102 See BOTHAM, supra note 36, at 176; KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 278–79 (2003) (“Whereas 
officials openly and effectively stymied the enforcement of Brown in large areas of the country for 
decades, opposition to the implementation of Loving was relatively Lilliputian.”); SICKELS, supra note 
20, at 111 (“[O]fficial reaction to the Loving decision was mixed, ranging from acceptance to hostility 
. . . . ”); WALLENSTEIN, supra note 49, at 225 (“The major white newspapers in Virginia greeted the 
Supreme Court’s ruling with equanimity, black newspapers with congratulations.”). 
 103 KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 278–79 (citing examples); ROBINSON, supra note 36, at 142 
(same); SICKELS, supra note 20, at 112–15 (same). 
 104 MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 321 (2004) (noting that in the 1950s, more than 90 percent of 
white Americans opposed interracial marriage). Some polls showed majority support of miscegena-
tion laws though with less intensity. See PASCOE, supra 2, at 292. Opposition to same-sex marriage 
was both significantly less and dwindling at a faster rate. 
 While Justice Alito was correct that the issue of same-sex marriage was controversial in 2013, it 
was for the same reasons that interracial marriage was controversial in the 1960s—and still is in some 
corners of the country. Both forms of non-traditional marriage were condemned as violating a particu-
lar religious view of marriage that demanded only marriages between people of opposite genders and 
the same race could be ordained. In both instances, religious adherents demanded that their interpreta-
tion of marriage be enshrined in law, even though other religions would ordain such marriages and no 
secular rationale for these marriage prohibitions could be mustered. 
 105 See Joseph Carroll, Most Americans Approve of Interracial Marriage, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, 
Aug. 16, 2007, http://www.gallup.com/poll/28417/most-americans-approve-interracial-marriages.aspx, 
archived at http://perma.cc/3JRD-AXLQ. As recently as 1990, 65 % of respondents objected to having a 
close relative marry an African American. Trosino, supra note 18, at 93 (citing Lynne Duke, 25 Years 
After Landmark Decision, Still the Rarest of Wedding Bonds, WASH. POST, June 12, 1992, at A3). 
 106 Majority of Americans Now Support Gay Marriage, REUTERS, Feb. 26, 2014, http://
www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/26/us-usa-gay-survey-idUSBREA1P07020140226, archived at 
http://perma.cc/6T49-DBB4. It bears noting that support for same-sex marriage is not the right ques-
tion to be asking because DOMA was more limited. The Windsor decision did not mandate that states 
recognize same-sex marriage; rather, Windsor required that the federal government recognize valid 
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Windsor decision was announced. This is more than 700 months sooner than it 
took a majority of Americans to support interracial marriage following the Lov-
ing opinion. Furthermore, at the time of Loving, no state had repealed its misce-
genation law through a popular vote.107 In contrast, the voters of Maine, Mary-
land, and Washington State had all voted to legally recognize same-sex marriag-
es before the Court announced its opinion in Windsor.  
If Justice Alito were truly concerned about avoiding controversy, he would 
have been hard pressed to join the majority opinion in Loving if he had been on 
the Court at the time. Justice Alito’s position is in line with the Court’s approach 
in Jackson, Naim, and McLaughlin (all of which left miscegenation laws in 
place), rather than with the Court’s landmark decision in Loving. Justice Alito’s 
stated desire to avoid picking a side in a controversy exposes a similar problem. 
Justice Alito characterized Edith Windsor as asking the “Court to intervene in 
that debate” over marriage equality and seeking “a holding that enshrines in the 
Constitution a particular understanding of marriage under which the sex of the 
partners makes no difference.”108 The same can be said of the Lovings, who 
were asking the Court to hold that the U.S. Constitution enshrined a constitu-
tional “understanding of marriage under which the [race] of the partners makes 
no difference.”109 Laws denying rights to a wide swath of the American public 
often are controversial, but that does not absolve the courts of their responsibility 
to protect the rights of Americans targeted by discriminatory laws. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL SILENCE 
Justice Alito next argued in his Windsor dissent that same-sex marriage is 
not in the Constitution and therefore should not be protected by it: “Same-sex 
marriage presents a highly emotional and important question of public policy—
                                                                                                                           
state marriages, including those between same-sex couples. If the question is whether the federal gov-
ernment should recognize all marriages that were legally valid and recognized in the host state, one 
might expect even stronger support for same-sex couples who were married. 
 107 See KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 258 (noting legislative repeals). Indeed, Alabama did not vote 
to repeal its miscegenation law until 2000. 
 108 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2711 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 109 See id. Some may argue that just as the Supreme Court consciously delayed invalidating mis-
cegenation laws, it should similarly postpone invalidating same-sex marriage bans. The Court's 2014 
denial of review of seven same-sex marriage petitions indicates that the Court may indeed postpone 
ruling on the subject. Amy Howe, Today’s Orders: Same-Sex Marriage Petitions Denied, SCO-
TUSBLOG, Oct. 6, 2014, http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/10/todays-orders-same-sex-marriage-petitins-
denied/, archived at http://perma.cc/U6RN-QBMR. Such an argument for postponement, however, is 
unpersuasive. First, it assumes that the Court was right to participate in denying marriage to interracial 
couples when it refused to decide the issue in Jackson, Naim, and McLaughlin. Chief Justice Warren 
himself found the Court’s avoidance to be, in his words, “total bullshit.” Moreover, the Court did not 
wait for the controversy to die down or for public opinion to support interracial marriage before strik-
ing down all miscegenation laws as unconstitutional. Even if the Court’s approach to miscegenation 
laws counsel in favor of waiting for social attitudes regarding marriage restrictions to change, the 
majority of Americans have already evolved to supporting same-sex marriage. 
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but not a difficult question of constitutional law. The Constitution does not guar-
antee the right to enter into a same-sex marriage. Indeed, no provision of the 
Constitution speaks to the issue.”110 Justice Alito sought to then demonstrate his 
fealty to law by asserting that, “if the Constitution contained a provision guaran-
teeing the right to marry a person of the same sex, it would be our duty to en-
force that right. But the Constitution simply does not speak to the issue of same-
sex marriage.”111 Of course, if the Constitution explicitly recognized a right to 
same-sex marriage, it would be exceedingly unlikely that same-sex couples 
would need to seek redress from the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, Justice Alito 
ultimately concluded that constitutional silence, in and of itself, warrants rejec-
tion of constitutional protection for same-sex couples: “The silence of the Con-
stitution on this question should be enough to end the matter as far as the judici-
ary is concerned.”112 In sum, Justice Alito concluded that because the Constitu-
tion is silent on the issue of same-sex marriage, the federal government’s refusal 
to recognize state-sanctioned, legally valid same-sex marriages does not create a 
constitutional issue. 
This Part argues that in many ways, Justice Alito’s attempt to infer congres-
sional intent through constitutional silence presents a stronger rejoinder to the 
Loving opinion than to the Windsor majority opinion, given strong historical ev-
idence of politicians’ views of the issue during the 1860s. Although the Four-
teenth Amendment does not mention marriage, miscegenation laws featured 
prominently in the congressional debates over that amendment and related civil 
rights legislation. In the congressional debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
and the Fourteenth Amendment,113 members of Congress believed that miscege-
nation laws would remain intact.114 Some segregationists worried that extending 
equal rights to former slaves was inconsistent with the anti-miscegenation re-
gimes maintained by states.115 
Some congressional Democrats tried to derail the progress toward racial 
equality by raising the specter of miscegenation as a bogeyman against Republi-
can efforts to free slaves, enfranchise former slaves, and grant civil rights to 
black Americans.116 The Democrats did not actually believe that the Republican 
                                                                                                                           
 110 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2714 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 111 Id. at 2716. 
 112 Id. at 2718. 
 113 The Fourteenth Amendment was intended “in part to put the Civil Rights Act of 1866 beyond 
the reach of a potentially hostile subsequent Congress and ensure that the courts would not declare it 
unconstitutional.” WALLENSTEIN, supra note 49, at 59–60. 
 114 See KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 250; id. at 277 (“[W]hen the Fourteenth Amendment was 
drawn up and ratified, the vast majority of its supporters did not envision it as a bar to antimiscegena-
tion laws . . . . ”). 
 115 See Novkov, supra note 70, at 349 (“Interracial intimacy gained political salience in response 
to the fears of many elite whites in all regions about the scope of freedom for former slaves.”). 
 116 See Alfred Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original 
Intent, 52 VA. L. REV. 1224, 1230 (1966). 
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efforts would invalidate state miscegenation laws; Democrats raised the prospect 
of interracial marriage “throughout the Reconstruction period as a political 
smokescreen.”117 Off the floor of Congress, Democrats tried to paint Republi-
cans as pro-miscegenation.118 For example, during the presidential election of 
l864, Democratic pamphleteers in New York sought to convince readers that 
Abraham Lincoln supported interracial marriage.119 
Though some disagreement exists among scholars,120 evidence suggests 
that even Republicans who supported the Fourteenth Amendment neither fa-
vored nor viewed the Amendment as invalidating state miscegenation statutes. 
Many Republicans seeking equal rights for freed slaves did not intend these 
rights to extend to interracial marriage.121 For example, Republican senators, like 
Illinois Senator Lyman Trumbull, paradoxically supported both civil rights for 
black Americans and miscegenation laws, which he argued treated blacks and 
whites equally by forbidding both from marrying across racial lines.122 Similarly, 
                                                                                                                           
 117 Id. at 1253. KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 22 (“During the reaction against Reconstruction, white 
supremacists exploited fears of interracial intimacy as perhaps the major justification for subverting 
the civil and political rights that had been granted to blacks, and the major reason for confining blacks 
to their degraded ‘place’ at the bottom of the social hierarchy.”). 
 118 MORAN, supra note 9, at 26 (“[S]outhern Democrats coined the term miscegenation to ridicule 
the quest for racial equality during Reconstruction . . . . ”); ROBINSON, supra note 36, at xiv (“For 
instance, in 1883, when the liberal Virginia governor William Cameron placed black men on the 
Richmond school board, Democratic newspapers lambasted the decision by raising the fear of misce-
genation.”). 
 119 PASCOE, supra note 2, at 28 (noting that “the pamphlet built up to an argument that when 
Lincoln ‘proclaimed Emancipation he proclaimed also the mingling of the races. The one follows the 
other as surely as noonday follows sunrise’”) (quoting ELISE LEMIRE, “MISCEGENATION”: MAKING 
RACE IN AMERICA 116 (2002))). 
 120 Compare Steven A. Bank, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Dilemma of Symmetry: The Un-
derstanding of Equality in the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 303, 305 
(1995) (“Moreover, when directly confronted with the miscegenation question, several Republicans 
called for the repeal of anti-miscegenation statutes on the basis of their understanding of equality, and 
no supporter of the bill sought to avoid the issue by defending the constitutionality of anti-
miscegenation laws or by invoking the principle of symmetrical equality.”), with Novkov, supra note 
70, at 349 (“While some scholars have suggested that the congressional Radical Republicans endorsed 
sweeping egalitarian reform, including the elimination of bans on interracial intimacy and the deseg-
regation of schools, those approving the Fourteenth Amendment on the state level likely did not favor 
these implications as consequences of its passage.”). 
 121 COTT, supra note 2, at 100 (“Only a rare civil rights supporter aimed to undo the many laws, 
northern and southern, on this subject. Although the Republicans wanted to guarantee freedmen equal 
rights before the law in most respects, they did not have in mind guaranteeing them the right to marry 
white women.”). 
 122 Avins, supra note 116, at 1232. Senator Trumbull maintained:  
‘[Y]our law forbidding marriages between whites and blacks operates alike on both 
races. This bill does not interfere with it. If the negro is denied the right to marry a 
white person, the white person is equally denied the right to marry the negro. I see no 
discrimination against either in this respect that does not apply to both.’ 
Id. (quoting Senator Trumbull). Senator Trumbull argued that it was “‘a misrepresentation of this bill 
[Freedmen’s Bureau Bill] to say that it interferes with those laws.’” Id. at 1233; see id. at 1253 
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two and a half weeks after he voted for the Fourteenth Amendment, West Virgin-
ia Senator Waitman T. Willey, a Republican, spoke in favor of voting rights for 
black Americans in the District of Columbia, noting such a change “‘creates no 
barrier to the interposition of legislative prohibitions against such intermar-
riage.’”123 When Democrats opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1875 as undermin-
ing miscegenation laws, South Carolina Congressman Joseph H. Rainey, a black 
Republican, responded that “we do not ask . . . that the two races should inter-
marry one with the other. God knows we are perfectly content.’”124 Republican 
congressmen did not believe that miscegenation laws were unconstitutional un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment or federal civil rights legislation125 because Re-
publican congressmen, by and large, did not consider interracial marriage to be a 
civil right.126 Ultimately, historians of marriage, such as Hendrick Hartog, have 
concluded that the post-Civil War Congress did not intend the Fourteenth 
Amendment to be a federal foray into the state issue of marriage requirements.127 
When the Lovings challenged Virginia’s miscegenation law in federal 
court, the State argued that neither the state legislatures nor the Congress of the 
Reconstruction Era intended to nullify miscegenation laws with either the Four-
teenth Amendment or ancillary civil rights legislation.128 First, the State of Vir-
                                                                                                                           
(“Trumbull, in particular, vigorously denied that his proposals, which were later embodied in the four-
teenth amendment, would overturn state anti-miscegenation laws, and angrily criticized President 
Andrew Johnson for even alluding to them in his veto message.”); see also KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 
251 (“Most [congressmen] subscribed to Lyman Trumbull’s interpretation, believing that the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 would not grant colored people a federal right to marry across racial lines.”). 
 123 Avins, supra note 116, at 1237. 
 124 Id. at 1246. 
 125 See Mark Tushnet, Civil Rights and Social Rights: The Future of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1207, 1209 (1992). 
 126 See MORAN, supra note 9, at 77 (“As the federal government undertook to rehabilitate former 
black slaves during Reconstruction, the scope of the equality principle was limited to preserve anti-
miscegenation statutes. Officials were quick to distinguish between ‘political’ equality, which related 
to formal access to the governmental process, and ‘social’ equality, which related to informal relations 
among neighbors, friends, and family.”); Avins, supra note 116, at 1234; see also KENNEDY, supra 
note 2, at 252 (“During debates held prior to congressional passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, its 
proponents repeatedly denied that it would affect the legality of properly drafted antimiscegenation 
laws.”). In contrast, the Loving Court described marriage as “one of the basic civil rights of man.” 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). 
 127 HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 16–17 (2000) (“That implicit 
denial of constitutional responsibility was reaffirmed, explicitly and consciously, during the debates 
over the Fourteenth Amendment after the Civil War.”). Historian Steven A. Bank disagrees and re-
futes the evidence of earlier scholars, like Avins. See Bank, supra note 120, at 324; see also KENNE-
DY, supra note 2, at 252 (“The historical record strongly indicates that the politicians who framed the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not intend for it to render illegal statutes prohibiting interracial mar-
riage.”). 
 128 Brief for Appellee at 1, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395), 1967 WL 93641, at 
*5 (arguing that “an analysis of the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment conclusively 
establishes the clear understanding—both of the legislators who framed and adopted the Amendment 
and the legislatures which ratified it—that the Fourteenth Amendment had no application whatever to 
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ginia argued that the “States which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment clearly 
signified their intent by continuation of their anti-miscegenation laws contempo-
raneously with the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.”129 Second, Vir-
ginia’s lawyers pointed to the speeches of “Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, 
who had introduced the Bill and was its manager [and] made it clear that there 
was no intention to nullify the anti-miscegenation statutes or constitutional re-
quirements of the various states or to restrict such future legislation as to misce-
genation.”130 The State’s attorneys emphasized that in defending civil rights leg-
islation, Senator Trumbull argued: 
[Y]our law forbidding marriages between whites and blacks operates 
alike on both races. This bill does not interfere with it. If the negro is 
denied the right to marry a white person, the white person is equally 
denied the right to marry the negro. I see no discrimination against ei-
ther in this respect that does not apply to both.131  
 Senator Trumbull foreshadowed the equal-application theory that the 
U.S. Supreme Court adopted in 1883 in Pace v. Alabama, in which the Court 
upheld miscegenation laws because they applied equally to black and white peo-
ple.132 In 1963, the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in McLaughlin v. Florida re-
pudiated the reasoning of Pace.133 Despite this, the State of Virginia attempted to 
resurrect it by quoting a congressman from the Reconstruction era.134 
                                                                                                                           
the anti-miscegenation statutes of the various States and did not interfere in any way with the power of 
the States to adopt such statutes”). 
 129 Id. at *28 (“In this connection, a comparison of the States which retained their anti-
miscegenation laws as late as 1951 with the list of States which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment 
reveals that a majority of such States maintained their anti-miscegenation laws in force after ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; PAULI MURRAY, STATES’ 
LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR 18 (1951))). 
 130 Id. at *16. 
 131 Id. at *16–*17; see also ROBINSON, supra note 36, at 26 (“Senator Pitt Fessenden also sug-
gested the consistency of anti-miscegenation laws with civil rights measures by asserting that the anti-
marriage laws applied to both races and provided ‘equal’ punishment for both races.”) (citation omit-
ted). 
 132 Brief for Appellee, supra note 128, at *16–*17 (“If the negro is denied the right to marry a 
white person, the white person is equally denied the right to marry the negro. I see no discrimination 
against either in this respect that does not apply to both.”); see infra notes 231–233 and accompanying 
text (discussing Pace). 
 133 153 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1963). 
 134 Brief for Appellee, supra note 128, at *18. Virginia’s brief quoted Rep. Samuel W. Moulton 
of Illinois, who stated:  
I deny that it is a civil right for a white man to marry a black woman or for a black man 
to marry a white woman . . . . The law, as I understand it, in all the States, applies 
equally to the white man and the black man, and there being no distinction, it will not 
operate injuriously against either the white or the black . . . . 
Id.; see Ariela R. Dubler, From McLaughlin v. Florida to Lawrence v. Texas: Sexual Freedom and the 
Road to Marriage, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1165, 1178–79 (2006). 
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Although the Loving Court unanimously rejected the State’s arguments on 
the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Alito accepted a 
variant of them in his Windsor dissent. Justice Alito was correct that the Consti-
tution is silent on the issue of same-sex marriage. Neither the drafters of Fifth 
nor of the Fourteenth Amendment expressed any intent to protect same-sex cou-
ples from discrimination.135 This is not surprising; same-sex marriage was never 
discussed during the passage of either the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth 
Amendment because there was no concept of homosexuality or of same-sex 
couples.136 In contrast, legislators were well aware of the possibility of interra-
cial couples wanting to marry and they explicitly supported prohibitions on in-
terracial marriage. Many legislators who voted for the Fourteenth Amendment 
did so on the explicit understanding that the amendment would not invalidate 
state anti-miscegenation laws.137 In contrast, no congressman conditioned his 
vote for the Fifth Amendment on assurances that the federal government would 
not have to recognize same-sex marriages.138 
Furthermore, Justice Alito’s description of the Constitution is a bit superfi-
cial because the Constitution is not completely silent: the Fourteenth Amend-
ment provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”139 Although Justice Alito is correct that the Four-
teenth Amendment does not explicitly pronounce who is entitled to what rights, 
his approach would gut the Amendment because the text does not proscribe any 
specific type of discrimination.140 The significance that Justice Alito attaches to 
purported silence is too sweeping. The Constitution is silent—under Justice 
                                                                                                                           
 135 Because Loving dealt with a state law (Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statute) and Windsor 
dealt with a federal law (Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act), different constitutional sources of 
equal protection principles were used. The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause applies to 
challenges of state laws, whereas the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause governs Equal Protection 
claims challenging federal laws. The substance of the Equal Protection analysis is the same under 
either provision. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217–18 (1995). 
 136 Marriage laws were historically written in gender specific language because the concept of 
homosexuality did not yet exist. While the act of sodomy did exist and was criminalized, same-sex 
couples were not visible and were given no thought when drafting marriage statutes. 
 137 See ROBINSON, supra note 36, at 26 (“Republican congressmen answered almost unanimously 
that civil rights legislation would have no harmful effect upon the right of states to legislate against 
interracial marriage.”). 
 138 When developing our democratic structures of government, the early congresses did not de-
bate or consider such domestic issues as marriage. HARTOG, supra note 127, at 16 (“For the better part 
of two centuries, the agencies of the federal government claimed little constitutional responsibility or 
interest over the law of marriage. During the framing of the Constitution in 1787, the topic never 
arose.”). 
 139 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 140 Indeed the early Court held that equal protection applied only to African-Americans. Slaugh-
ter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81–83 (1873). This led the Court to reject an equal protection 
challenge to laws that prevented women from voting. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1875). 
Today we would see such a truncation of equal protection to be anathema to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Yet this is the approach that Justice Alito adopts in his Windsor dissent. 
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Alito’s treatment—to myriad principles that are now well-established including 
judicial review, whether the Bill of Rights applies to the states, personal jurisdic-
tion, and the right to procreate, among others.141 Justice Alito’s treatment of si-
lence would undo over two centuries of our constitutional understanding of gov-
ernment structure and individual rights.142 
In short, if Constitutional silence is sufficient reason to deny recognition of 
marriage rights under the U.S. Constitution, then Justice Alito, had he been on 
the Court in 1967, would have had to conclude that the Lovings’ constitutional 
claim had no merit. The amount of constitutional text devoted to interracial mar-
riage matches that devoted to same-sex marriage.143 Ultimately, constitutional 
silence is not a legitimate justification for holding that marriage discrimination is 
permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment, whether that discrimination is 
based on race or sex.144 
                                                                                                                           
 141 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Wrong Questions Get Wrong Answers: An Analysis of Professor 
Carter’s Approach to Judicial Review, 66 B.U. L. REV. 47, 56–57 (1986) (discussing potential out-
comes of originalist approaches to Constitutional provisions). 
 142 Professor Doug NeJaime explains that—although arguing the Constitution is silent on the 
definition of marriage—Justice Alito tried to make the Constitution tow his ideological line that mar-
riage must be opposite gender: 
[Justice Alito] acknowledges that the parties are engaged in “a debate between two 
competing views of marriage.” What he terms the “traditional” or “conjugal” view 
“sees marriage as an intrinsically opposite-sex institution.” Under this view, “the insti-
tution of marriage was created for the purpose of channeling heterosexual intercourse 
into a structure that supports child rearing.” That structure is defined by biological, du-
al-gender parenting. Justice Alito contrasts this with a “newer view” he labels the 
“‘consent-based’ vision of marriage, a vision that primarily defines marriage as the sol-
emnization of mutual commitment—marked by strong emotional attachment and sexual 
attraction—between two persons.” “Proponents of same-sex marriage,” he explains, 
“argue that because gender differentiation is not relevant to this vision, the exclusion of 
same-sex couples from the institution is rank discrimination.” Justice Alito contends 
that in pursuing her claims, Edie Windsor sought “a holding that enshrines in the Con-
stitution a particular understanding of marriage under which the sex of the partners 
makes no difference.” He rejects this bid by explaining that, as between the “tradition-
al” and “consent-based” views of marriage, “[t]he Constitution does not codify either.” 
Yet in conceptualizing the scope of the constitutional right to marry earlier in his opin-
ion—easily dismissing any claim by same-sex couples to a fundamental right—Justice 
Alito writes into the Constitution the “traditional” view of marriage. Rather than under-
stand the constitutional right to marry in relation to the evolving contours of marriage, 
he cements the meaning of marriage for constitutional purposes. Ultimately, even as 
Justice Alito asserts that he “would not presume to enshrine either vision of marriage in 
our constitutional jurisprudence,” he does just that—and in a way inconsistent with 
Turner, the Court’s most recent precedent on the fundamental right to marry. 
Douglas NeJaime, Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 219, 233–34 (2013), http://www.
yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1205_3mchpr78.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/L77J-9APS. 
 143 Although the Constitution does address race, it never mentions marriage. 
 144 See Leslie, supra note 13, at 1131 (arguing that same-sex marriage bans constitute sex dis-
crimination). 
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III. LEAVE IT TO OTHER ACTORS: STATES, ELECTED OFFICIALS 
Justice Alito, in his Windsor dissent, next asserted that federal courts are not 
the appropriate decision-maker on the issue of marriage equality. Framing his 
decision to uphold DOMA as an act of humility,145 Justice Alito argued that “the 
people” should decide the issue, not the Supreme Court.146 By “the people,” he 
meant elected officials.147 Justice Alito argued that the U.S. Constitution “does 
not dictate” whether same-sex couples have a right to marry, but instead “leaves 
the choice to the people, acting through their elected representatives at both the 
federal and state levels.”148 Further, Justice Alito put down a marker that the Su-
preme Court should not hold in any future case that state same-sex marriage 
bans violate the Equal Protection Clause. He expressed his belief “that the ques-
tion of same-sex marriage should be resolved primarily at the state level” and 
memorialized his “hope that the Court will ultimately permit the people of each 
State to decide this question for themselves.”149 This Part shows that opponents 
of interracial marriage used the same states’ rights arguments to defend their 
views. It then argues that, given that DOMA was a federal statute that eliminated 
deference to states on the issue of same-sex marriage, Alito’s mention of states’ 
rights was better suited for Loving v. Virginia than for United States v. Windsor. 
The deference-to-states argument may seem appealing in that marriage has 
long been the prerogative of state law. States have differed in their approaches to 
many aspects of marriage, including the legal requirements for marriage, 
grounds for divorce, and the legal consequences of marriage.150 Throughout 
America’s first two centuries, the federal government largely stayed out of the 
business of defining marriage.151 However, Justice Alito tried to have his cake 
                                                                                                                           
 145 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2715 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that Edith 
Windsor and the U.S. Department of Justice “seek this innovation not from a legislative body elected 
by the people, but from unelected judges. Faced with such a request, judges have cause for both cau-
tion and humility”). 
 146 Id. at 2718–19 (“Because our constitutional order assigns the resolution of questions of this 
nature to the people, I would not presume to enshrine either vision of marriage in our constitutional 
jurisprudence.”). 
 147 Id. at 2716 (“Any change on a question so fundamental should be made by the people through 
their elected officials.”). 
 148 Id. at 2711. 
 149 Id. at 2720. 
 150 HARTOG, supra note 127, at 12; see Leslie, supra note 13, at 1119 (discussing coverture). 
 151 The primary exception to this federal silence on marriage matters involved the congressional 
move to ban polygamy as a condition to Utah’s admission to the Union. HARTOG, supra note 127, at 
322 n.27 (“Only in the case of Mormon polygamy did Congress interfere with the instituted marital 
rules of the territorial legislatures.”). Congress criminalized bigamy in 1862 with the Morrill Anti-
Bigamy Act, which made bigamy a federal crime with a maximum prison sentence of five years. BO-
THAM, supra note 36, at 82–83. With the Poland Act of 1874, Congress responded to the perceived 
problem of polygamy in the Utah Territory by “eliminat[ing] offices held by territorial officials and 
transferr[ing] their duties to federally appointed officials. In essence, the act permitted federal courts 
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and eat it, too. He claimed that states are the appropriate locus of decision-
making as to marriage but then championed a federal law that requires federal 
agencies to refuse to respect those same state decisions whenever states protect 
same-sex couples.  
More importantly, the states’ rights arguments that Justice Alito advocated 
were recycled from decades of segregationist rhetoric. States’ rights formed the 
core of the defense of miscegenation laws for a century until the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Loving.152 State courts consistently upheld their state misce-
genation laws, relying on federalism and states’ rights arguments.153 Such argu-
ments are generally associated with the former confederate states. For example, 
the Missouri Supreme Court held that that state’s miscegenation law did not vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment because “[t]he power of each state to regulate 
and control marriages within its jurisdiction[] is as unquestionable as state sover-
eignty.”154 In reversing a lower court decision, the Missouri Supreme Court 
mocked the lower court for ascribing “magical power” to the Fourteenth 
Amendment.155 Most post-Reconstruction southern courts in miscegenation cas-
es thought the supremacy of state sovereignty to be beyond question.156 
One of the most powerful invocations of the states’ rights argument, how-
ever, came from the north. In 1871, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld that 
state’s miscegenation law in State v. Gibson.157 The court’s discussion of mar-
riage noted: 
The right, in the states, to regulate and control, to guard, protect, and 
preserve this God-given, civilizing, and Christianizing institution is of 
                                                                                                                           
to try federal crimes, including bigamy, and allowed these courts to appoint juries of which at least 
half the members could be non-Mormon.” Id. at 83. As one scholar noted:  
The power of Congress—qua the federal government—to regulate territorial law was so 
clear to the Court as to be inarguable, a given. Thus, with regard to restrictions on po-
lygamous marriages, the Court’s decision declared territorial laws against polygamy to 
be constitutional—a legitimate function of the federal government. Reynolds thus 
strongly affirmed the authority of the federal government to enact marriage law. 
Id. at 83–84. 
 152 Id. at 131 (“In nearly every case—from Scott v. State of Georgia in 1869 to Loving v. Virginia 
in 1967—and in nearly every region of the country, the states’ right argument formed the most com-
monly cited legal basis for antimiscegenation statutes.”). 
 153 See, e.g., State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 403–04 (1871) (stating that the states “undoubtedly 
have the power to pass such laws” under the police power); State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 178 (1883) 
(stating that states held the power to regulate marriage laws); Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. 287, 296 (1871) 
(stating that the U.S. Constitution did not restrict state laws regarding marriage). 
 154 Jackson, 80 Mo. at 178. 
 155 Id. at 176. 
 156 See Lonas, 50 Tenn. at 296 (“That this [marital] relation is subject to the law of the State, 
without any restriction from the Constitution of the United States, is too clear for argument.”); see 
also Gibson, 36 Ind. at 403–04; Jackson, 80 Mo. at 178. 
 157 36 Ind. at 405. 
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inestimable importance, and cannot be surrendered, nor can the states 
suffer or permit any interference therewith. If the federal government 
can determine who may marry in a state, there is no limit to its pow-
er.158 
Historian Peggy Pascoe has explained that “[w]ith an authority that only a 
northern state free of the taint of secession could muster, the Gibson decision 
established the principle that marriage was a state rather than a federal matter, 
and so could be held apart from federal guarantees and civil rights protec-
tions.”159 With its northern provenance, the Gibson opinion “offered judges 
across the nation a template for using state police power to sidestep federal guar-
antees of civil rights.”160 Ultimately, by the end of the Reconstruction era, the 
states’ rights mantra insulated miscegenation laws from federal invalidation.161 
Similarly, foreshadowing Justice Alito’s assertion in his Windsor dissent, 
supporters of miscegenation laws strenuously argued that legislatures and public 
opinion should decide the legality of interracial marriage, not courts.162 Federal 
courts upheld miscegenation laws, asserting that the issue of interracial marriage 
bans “is more properly . . . within the range of legislative duty.”163 Upon remand 
from the U.S. Supreme Court in Naim,164 the Virginia Supreme Court in the 
1950s asserted that arguments against its miscegenation law “are properly ad-
dressable to the legislature, which enacted the law in the first place, and not to 
this court, whose prescribed role in the separated powers of government is to 
adjudicate, and not to legislate.”165 In the California Supreme Court’s 1948 deci-
sion in Perez v. Sharp, defenders of California’s miscegenation law asserted that 
opponents of miscegenation laws should limit their efforts to legislators, not 
                                                                                                                           
 158 Id. at 403. 
 159 PASCOE, supra note 2, at 56. 
 160 Id. at 50. 
 161 BOTHAM, supra note 36, at 27 (“By the end of Reconstruction, in all cases involving interra-
cial marriage, courts consistently ruled that . . . laws pertaining to marriage were and had always been 
subject to the control of the state and it was therefore the state’s right to enact legislation prohibiting 
intermarriage . . . . ”); see id. at 144 (“[W]henever cases challenged the constitutionality of antimisce-
genation statutes, court decisions continued to assert the states’ right to regulate marriage as the basis 
for the statutes’ legitimacy.”). 
 162 Novkov, supra note 70, at 377 (“Those opposing the judicial extension of marriage rights have 
also addressed the appropriate institutional location for social change, rooting it in the democratic 
process and public opinion, and specifically denying the authority of the courts to promote it. These 
structural arguments do not echo (but do resemble) nineteenth-century courts’ arguments about the 
need for state rather than federal control over marriage policy.”); see Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 324 
(1869) (“The power of the Legislature over the subject matter when the Code was adopted, will not, I 
suppose, be questioned. The Legislature certainly had as much right to regulate the marriage relation 
by prohibiting it between persons of different races as they had to prohibit it between persons within 
the Levitical degrees, or between idiots.”). 
 163 State v. Tutty, 41 F. 753, 762 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1890). 
 164 See supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text. 
 165 Loving v. Commonwealth, 147 S.E.2d 78, 82 (Va. 1966). 
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judges.166 In his Perez dissent, Justice John W. Shenk asserted that those “favor-
ing present day amalgamation of these distinct races irrespective of scientific 
data . . . should direct their efforts to the Legislature in order to effect the change 
in state policy which they espouse.”167 Linking two of Justice Alito’s rationales 
for upholding DOMA, Justice Shenk asserted that the presence of controversy 
mandates greater judicial deference to the legislature with respect to miscegena-
tion laws.168 
While these states’ rights defenses of miscegenation laws took root in the 
nineteenth-century South, they retained their potency across the nation well into 
the twentieth century. In 1922, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld its miscegena-
tion law with the assertion that marriage “is peculiarly a matter of state regula-
tion.”169 The following year, the Oklahoma Supreme Court similarly upheld its 
miscegenation law against a federal constitutional challenge, reasoning “the laws 
regulating marriages come clearly within the police power of the state, and, in 
the exercise of the state’s sovereign right, it has the sole and only power within 
the state to regulate who shall, or who shall not, marry.”170 Two decades later, in 
1942, the Montana Supreme Court—in a case involving the estate of a deceased 
Japanese man and his surviving white wife—upheld the public administrator’s 
                                                                                                                           
 166 Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 43 (Cal. 1948) (Shenk, J., dissenting). Justice Shenk stated: 
Courts are neither peculiarly qualified nor organized to determine the underlying ques-
tions of fact with reference to which the validity of the legislation must be determined. 
Differing ideas of public policy do not properly concern them. The courts have no pow-
er to determine the merits of conflicting theories, to conduct an investigation of facts 
bearing upon questions of public policy or expediency, or to sustain or frustrate the leg-
islation according to whether they happen to approve or disapprove the legislative de-
termination of such questions of fact. 
Id.; see id. at 45 (“[L]egislators are not required to wait upon the completion of scientific research to 
determine whether the underlying facts carry sufficient weight to more fully sustain the regulation.”). 
 167 Id. at 46. Justice Shenk further stated: 
Those favoring present day amalgamation of these distinct races irrespective of scien-
tific data of a cautionary nature based upon the experience of others, or who feel that a 
supposed infrequency of interracial unions will minimize undesirable consequences to 
the point that would justify lifting the prohibition upon such unions, should direct their 
efforts to the Legislature in order to effect the change in state policy which they espouse 
. . . .  
Id. 
 168 Id. at 42 (“The Legislature is, in the first instance, the judge of what is necessary for the public 
welfare. Earnest conflict of opinion makes it especially a question for the Legislature and not for the 
courts.”); see id. at 43 (“The fact that the finding of the Legislature is in favor of the truth of one side 
of a matter as to which there is still room for difference of opinion is not material. What the people’s 
legislative representatives believe to be for the public good must be accepted as tending to promote 
the public welfare. It has been said that any other basis would conflict with the spirit of the Constitu-
tion and would sanction measures opposed to a republican form of government.”). 
 169 Kirby v. Kirby, 206 P. 405, 406 (Ariz. 1922). 
 170 Blake v. Sessions, 220 P. 876, 879 (Okla. 1923). 
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refusal to recognize their Washington-performed marriage because of Montana’s 
miscegenation law.171 The court reasoned: “The control and regulation of mar-
riage is a matter of domestic concern within each state. In the adoption of poli-
cies in respect thereto . . . the state is sovereign and not subject to the control of 
the Federal Government nor of the laws of any other state.”172 
Federal courts, too, embraced the states’ rights rhetoric in upholding the 
constitutionality of state anti-miscegenation regimes.173 For example, a Texas 
federal court upheld Emile Francois’s criminal conviction—and his sentence of 
five years in a penitentiary—for violating Texas’s miscegenation law by marry-
ing a black woman.174 The federal court found no violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, reasoning, in part, that “[t]he subject of marriage is one exclusively 
under the control of each state.”175 Similarly, in State v. Tutty,176 a federal district 
court in Georgia rejected a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to that state’s re-
fusal to recognize interracial marriages performed in other states. The court cited 
an opinion of the Kentucky Supreme Court for the proposition that “marriage 
was more than a contract; that it was the most elementary and useful sovereign 
power of the state.”177 The federal court in Tutty ultimately concluded that it pos-
sessed neither the right nor the power to interfere with Georgia’s policies regard-
ing miscegenation.178  
By deferring to state court opinions upholding miscegenation laws, federal 
courts essentially “allowed state courts to remove the contract of marriage from 
the reach of civil rights laws.”179 As late as 1944, the Tenth Circuit upheld Okla-
homa’s miscegenation statute against a Fourteenth Amendment challenge by 
invoking the states’ rights refrain to conclude that “a state is empowered to for-
bid marriages between persons of African descent and persons of other races or 
descents. Such a statute does not contravene the Fourteenth Amendment.”180 
Ultimately, for several generations, both state and federal courts effectively re-
                                                                                                                           
 171 In re Takahashi’s Estate, 129 P.2d 217, 222 (Mont. 1942). 
 172 Id. at 220. 
 173 See PASCOE, supra note 2, at 64 (“In all but one of them, federal judges solved the conflict 
between state miscegenation laws and federal civil rights laws by adopting states’ rights arguments.”); 
see, e.g., In re Hobbs, 12 F. Cas. 262, 264 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1871). 
 174 Ex parte Francois, 9 F. Cas. 699, 701 (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1879). 
 175 Id. at 700. 
 176 41 F. at 763. 
 177 Tutty, 41 F. at 759 (discussing Maguire v. Maguire, 37 Ky. (7 Dana) 181 (1838)); see also id. 
at 761 (explaining that marriages performed in other states must be held void “if the statutory provi-
sion is expressive of a decided state policy as a matter of morals”). 
 178 Id. at 762–63 (“The policy of the state upon this subject has been declared, as we have seen, 
by its supreme court as well as by its statutes, and it is enough to say that this court is unable to dis-
cover anything in that policy with which the federal courts have the right or the power to interfere.”); 
see id. at 762 (holding that “the fourteenth amendment to the constitution does not limit the power of 
the state to protect its citizens” (citing Railway Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 33 (1889)). 
 179 PASCOE, supra note 2, at 64–65. 
 180 Stevens v. United States, 146 F.2d 120, 123 (10th Cir. 1944). 
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moved federal authority to constrain states from adopting and enforcing race-
based marriage laws.181 
The states’ rights argument provided the core defense of miscegenation 
laws in both the Perez and Loving cases. The Perez dissent cited a string of cases 
for the proposition that “the right of the state to exercise extensive control over 
the marriage contract has always been recognized.”182 In the Loving litigation, 
the State of Virginia again turned to the states’ rights argument. This was not 
surprising. Previously, in the mid-1950s Naim case,183 the Virginia Supreme 
Court refused to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment in a manner that would 
“prohibit the State from enacting legislation to preserve the racial integrity of its 
citizens, or which denies the power of the State to regulate the marriage relation 
so that it shall not have a mongrel breed of citizens.”184 In its brief, the State of 
Virginia in Loving invoked the nearly unbroken line of state and federal court 
opinions upholding miscegenation laws based largely on states’ rights rhetoric. 
The State argued that it was “‘the exclusive province of the legislature of each 
State to make the determination for its citizens as to the desirability, character 
and scope of a policy of permitting or preventing such alliances—a province 
which the judiciary may not, under well-settled constitutional doctrine, in-
vade.’”185 The Perez and Loving opinions both rejected the states’ rights “defer-
ence-to-legislatures” arguments. 
Justice Alito’s reference to deference to state legislators is more appropriate 
to the Loving litigation than to Windsor. Loving represented a sea change as “a 
federal court—for the first time in U.S. history—deemed the individual’s right to 
marry superior to the states’ right to regulate marriage law.”186 In contrast, the 
Windsor majority’s decision to strike down DOMA was far less intrusive. From 
a federalism standpoint, Windsor represented a rather commonplace instance of a 
federal court striking down a federal law. 
Moreover, Justice Alito’s leave-it-to-the-states argument is particularly odd 
given that DOMA eliminated federal deference to states on the issue of marriage 
equality for same-sex couples. Justice Alito noted that the majority believed that 
DOMA “encroache[d] upon the States’ sovereign prerogative to define mar-
riage,”187 but he claimed no such intrusion existed.188 Yet Justice Alito contra-
                                                                                                                           
 181 WALLENSTEIN, supra note 49, at 120 (“From the 1880s into the 1960s, no state had to answer 
to federal authority for what it chose to do regarding the law of race and marriage.”). 
 182 Perez, 198 P.2d at 37 (Shenk, J., dissenting). 
 183 See supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text. 
 184 Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955). 
 185 PASCOE, supra note 2, at 80 (quoting Brief for Appellee, supra note 128, at *32, *38, *50). 
 186 BOTHAM, supra note 36, at 175. 
 187 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2719 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 188 Id. at 2720 (“In any event, § 3 of DOMA, in my view, does not encroach on the prerogatives 
of the States, assuming of course that the many federal statutes affected by DOMA have not already 
done so.”). 
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dicted his own states’ rights argument by asserting that the U.S. Congress is “en-
titled” to pick a side in the debate over marriage equality for same-sex couples. 
For example, he asserted that “both Congress and the States are entitled to enact 
laws recognizing either of the two understandings of marriage.”189 DOMA, 
however, effectively overrode every state decision to prefer a gender-neutral 
view of marriage.190 In contrast, the Windsor decision itself did not override the 
decisions of state legislatures; it merely held that the federal government would 
respect state definitions of marriage when granting federal benefits.191 
Because the Windsor case did not involve the constitutionality of any deci-
sions made by state officials, Justice Alito’s discussion of deference to states 
seems geared more for a future case in which a state law that prohibits same-sex 
marriage is challenged. Through his Windsor dissent, Justice Alito indicated that 
in such a case he would vote against marriage equality while invoking the prin-
ciple of deference to states. 192 But Justice Alito’s deference argument does not 
show that state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage are constitutional. Rather, 
Justice Alito assumes that these laws are constitutional, because states are enti-
tled to deference only when they are not violating the U.S. Constitution. When-
ever a state or local government is held to violate the Constitution, deference 
ceases.193 Indeed, the underlying purpose of Section One of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is to reject deference to states when they deny equal protection of 
their laws to some of their citizens. 
If, in a future decision, Justice Alito does invoke deference to states, he will 
be taking a page from the segregationists’ playbook. Whereas the Windsor deci-
sion did not force states to recognize same-sex marriages within their borders, 
the Loving decision did precisely what Justice Alito suggested the Supreme 
Court should not do: compel individual states to recognize marriages under their 
state law that the state legislators had outlawed. While facially an act of modes-
ty, Justice Alito’s paean to deference is the same argument that segregationists 
                                                                                                                           
 189 Id. at 2719. 
 190 With respect to the locus of decision-making on marriage equality, some of the states that 
recognize same-sex marriage have done so through a majority of state voters deciding to recognize 
these marriages. In contrast, not a single state that eliminated its miscegenation law before 1967 did so 
through a popular vote. Any such attempt would have failed. Americans overwhelmingly opposed 
interracial marriage in numbers far greater than the current opposition to same-sex marriage. See su-
pra notes 53–56 and accompanying text. Justice Alito ignored the fact that the citizens of a dozen 
states—some through direct popular votes, some through legislative action, and some through judicial 
action—have already decided the issue and concluded that same-sex marriages should be equal to 
opposite sex marriages. It was the federal government’s decision to enact DOMA that subverted the 
sovereignty of state decision-makers, including legislators, judges, and voters. 
 191 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696. 
 192 See id. at 2720 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 193 Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U .L. REV. 503, 546 (1985); see Ker v. 
California, 374 U.S. 23, 62 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“My Broth-
er Clark correctly states that only when state law ‘is not violative of the Federal Constitution’ may we 
defer to state law in gauging the validity of an arrest under the Fourth Amendment.”). 
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made to support miscegenation laws in those states where “the people through 
their elected officials” had decided to criminalize interracial marriage. If the Su-
preme Court in 1967 had adopted Justice Alito’s Windsor reasoning and deferred 
to state legislatures, criminal prohibitions on interracial marriage would have 
persisted, perhaps for decades.194 
When today’s opponents of marriage equality claim to champion states’ 
rights, these arguments should be greeted with suspicion. Segregationists em-
ployed this same rhetoric to justify some of the most invidious discrimination in 
our nation’s history. 
IV. TRADITION 
In his dissent to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in United States v. 
Windsor, Justice Alito next argued that DOMA is constitutional because same-
sex marriage is not deeply rooted in tradition. He stressed: “It is beyond dispute 
that the right to same-sex marriage is not deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition.”195 Justice Alito noted that “In this country, no State permitted 
same-sex marriage until the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held in 2003 
that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the State Constitution.”196 
He then described same-sex marriage as novel on an international scale as 
well.197 This Part first argues that Justice Alito’s tradition-based rationale for up-
holding DOMA is flawed for multiple reasons, including its framing, facts, and 
logic. This Part then shows, through a history of miscegenation laws in the Unit-
ed States, that the appeal to tradition would necessitate a different result in Lov-
ing v. Virginia.  
As an initial matter, Justice Alito framed the question improperly. The right 
at issue was not “the right to same-sex marriage” but the right to marry. The Su-
preme Court has recognized the right to marry in several cases, holding that the 
right cannot be denied to interracial couples,198 to prisoners,199 or to parents who 
                                                                                                                           
 194 See Avins, supra note 116, at 1225 (“It is doubtful whether Congress today could be induced 
to pass a statute eliminating anti-miscegenation laws.”); see also supra note 105 and accompanying 
text (noting that until the 1990s a majority of white Americans opposed their close relatives marrying 
an African American). 
 195 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2715 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, 
too, asserted that the argument “that same-sex marriage is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition’ . . . would of course be quite absurd.” Id. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Washington 
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997)). 
 196 Id. at 2715 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 
948 (Mass. 2003)). 
 197 See id. at 2715 (“Nor is the right to same-sex marriage deeply rooted in the traditions of other 
nations. No country allowed same-sex couples to marry until the Netherlands did so in 2000.”); see 
also id. at 2718 (“BLAG notes that virtually every culture, including many not influenced by the 
Abrahamic religions, has limited marriage to people of the opposite sex.”). 
 198 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 199 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 100 (1987). 
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fall behind on paying child support.200 Notably, in 1967 in Loving, the Court did 
not frame the question as “the right to interracial marriage”; rather, it noted that 
“[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal 
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”201 When proper-
ly framed, Windsor is about a deeply rooted right—the right to marry—which 
the Supreme Court has held “is of fundamental importance.”202 
As a factual matter, Justice Alito’s recitation of the history of same-sex 
marriage was a bit facile. He asserted that “there is no doubt that, throughout 
human history and across many cultures, marriage has been viewed as an exclu-
sively opposite-sex institution . . . .”203 Justice Alito was apparently unaware that 
many societies have historically recognized the legitimacy of same-sex relation-
ships.204 
As a matter of law and logic, Equal Protection is not coterminous with tra-
dition. As Professor Cass Sunstein explains, “the Equal Protection Clause is self-
consciously directed against traditional practices. It was designed to counteract 
practices that were time-honored and expected to endure. It is based on a norm 
of equality that operates as a critique of past practices.”205 Overreliance on tradi-
tion has been problematic, as when Chief Justice Roger B. Taney invoked Amer-
ica’s tradition of discrimination against African Americans to justify the opinion 
in Dred Scott.206 In enacting the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress created the 
framework for confronting inequality despite its pedigree. 
At a fundamental level, Justice Alito failed to appreciate that most discrim-
ination is based on tradition. For example, the discrimination that women face in 
the workforce is a continuation of the discrimination visited upon women in pri-
or centuries. When states forbade women from becoming lawyers, the Supreme 
                                                                                                                           
 200 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 390–91 (1978). 
 201 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
 202 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383; see id. at 384 (“[T]he right to marry is part of the fundamental 
‘right of privacy’ implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”). In narrowly framing 
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 203 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2718 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 204 See William N. Eskridge, A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1419–21 
(1993) (discussing stories of historical same-sex relationships from Native American, African, and 
Roman cultures). 
 205 Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1994). 
 206 See WALLENSTEIN, supra note 49, at 53; see also Frederick Schauer, Constitutionalism and 
Coercion, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1881, 1882–83 (2013) (recounting examples throughout American history 
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Court upheld these prohibitions as necessary to protect women.207 Our nation 
has spent far more of its history discriminating against racial minorities than pro-
tecting them from discrimination. Centuries of slavery were replaced with dec-
ades of Jim Crow laws that continued to prohibit African-Americans from such 
basic activities as using public swimming pools and drinking fountains. 
More importantly for our purposes, at the time of the Loving opinion, inter-
racial marriage was certainly “not deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tra-
dition.” Miscegenation laws were older than the nation itself. Most of the origi-
nal thirteen colonies prohibited interracial marriage or sex.208 Prohibitions in 
America against interracial marriage and intimacy date back to the 1600s.209 For 
example, in the 1660s the colony of Maryland prohibited “marriages between 
‘freeborne English women’ and ‘Negro Slaues [sic].’”210 The details of these 
prohibitions differed across the colonies: 
As of 1700, Delaware and South Carolina forbade bastardy and/or 
fornication but not marriage, while Rhode Island prohibited marriage 
only, Georgia and Massachusetts outlawed illicit marriage and sex, 
and the other colonies proscribed some combination of fornication, 
bastardy or marriage. And by 1800, in every colony that banned inter-
racial sex and/or marriage, all except Delaware, Georgia, and South 
Carolina also punished ministers or magistrates for solemnizing a 
marriage ceremony between a white person and a person of color. Ten 
of the thirteen original colonies thus enacted bans or restrictions on 
intermarriage within one hundred years after settlement.211 
Between the nation’s unification in the 1770s and its temporary division in the 
1860s, the nationwide coverage of miscegenation laws expanded and contracted, 
but was always extensive.212 
By 1860, the vast majority of states maintained miscegenation statutes; 
those that did not included South Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi.213 The 
absence of miscegenation laws reflected not tolerance of interracial marriage but 
a perceived lack of necessity given the existence of slave codes, which effective-
                                                                                                                           
 207 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (upholding prohibition against allowing women 
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 212 See PASCOE, supra note 2, at 21. 
 213 COTT, supra note 2, at 40–41. 
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ly accomplished the same end.214 As one North Carolina judge explained, mar-
riage is a contract and slaves were incapable of contracting.215 
The hard-fought freedoms won during the Civil War did not include long-
term marriage equality. Temporary gains were made in some southern statehouses 
and courthouses.216 On the legislative front, some southern legislatures fluctuat-
ed in their treatment of interracial marriage. For example, although South Caro-
lina’s 1868 constitution repealed the Palmetto State’s ban on miscegenation, the 
State reinstituted its miscegenation statute in 1879.217 Eventually, every southern 
state that repealed its miscegenation law—Louisiana, Mississippi, South Caroli-
na, Arkansas, and Florida—re-adopted its ban on interracial marriage between 
1879 and 1894.218 Indeed, some southern states strengthened their miscegenation 
laws, making interracial marriage a crime punishable by imprisonment for sev-
eral years.219 For example, in 1877, Virginia increased the maximum imprison-
ment for miscegenation from two years to five years.220 At one point, Mississippi 
made interracial marriage a felony punishable by life imprisonment.221 Many 
southern states amended their state constitutions to prohibit interracial mar-
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 215 Howard v. Howard, 51 N.C. (6 Jones) 235, 236 (1858); see Margaret A. Burnham, An Impos-
sible Marriage: Slave Law and Family Law, 5 LAW & INEQ. 187, 207–08 (1987). 
 216 See WALLENSTEIN, supra note 49, at 80. 
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 218 PASCOE, supra note 2, at 63. 
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 220 PASCOE, supra note 2, at 63; see id. (“[I]n 1879, Missouri raised its penalty to two years in 
prison. In 1884, the Maryland legislature redefined miscegenation as an ‘infamous crime’ punishable 
by prison sentences.”) (footnote omitted). 
 221 BOTHAM, supra note 36, at 52–53 (citing WALLENSTEIN, supra note 49, at 81–82). 
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riage.222 Legislators in the former slave states reasoned that miscegenation laws 
were now necessary in order to make white women less accessible to newly 
freed black men.223 The new wave of miscegenation laws, however, was by no 
means limited to the Confederacy, as Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, Ohio, 
Oregon, and West Virginia all enacted new bans on interracial marriage.224 
Opponents of miscegenation laws achieved some temporary judicial victo-
ries during Reconstruction as courts in a handful of states either condemned mis-
cegenation laws or recognized individual interracial marriages.225 For example, 
in 1872, the Alabama Supreme Court in Burns v. State referred to the Fourteenth 
Amendment when invalidating that state’s miscegenation law.226 Successes were 
short-lived, however, as those state supreme courts reversed themselves.227 Thus, 
five years after Burns, the same court—with different judges—overruled Burns 
and held that in voting to adopt the Fourteenth Amendment, the states did not 
“intend[] to deprive themselves of the important power of regulating matters of 
so great consequence and delicacy within their own borders for themselves, as it 
always was their undoubted right to do.”228 
Despite the brief respite from their anti-miscegenation regimes, when states 
resurrected their miscegenation prohibitions, state courts (as noted in Part III) 
upheld these racial marriage restrictions against challenges based on the Four-
teenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.229 Federal courts, too, uni-
                                                                                                                           
 222 Id. at 53; PASCOE, supra note 2, at 63 (“Five states—North Carolina in 1876, Florida in 1885, 
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 224 COTT, supra note 2, at 258. 
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 229 See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 179 (1883) (upholding Missouri miscegenation law); 
State v. Hairston, 63 N.C. 451, 453 (1869) (holding the Civil Rights Act of 1866 did not prohibit 
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formly upheld state miscegenation laws against constitutional challenge. For 
example, a federal judge in Virginia concluded: “The fourteenth amendment 
gives no power to congress to interfere with the right of a state to regulate the 
domestic relations of its own citizens, and if a state enact such laws as those 
which have been quoted, the federal courts must respect them as they stand, 
without inquiring into the reasons of them.”230 
After state and federal courts had decisively lined up in favor of upholding 
miscegenation laws, the Supreme Court entered the fray in 1883. In Pace v. Ala-
bama,231 the Justices upheld an Alabama criminal law that punished interracial 
adultery more severely than same-race adultery. The Court held that the law did 
not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in part 
because the law punished equally both whites and blacks who engaged in inter-
racial intimacy.232 Because miscegenation laws employed the similar equality of 
punishment for perceived racial transgressions, courts interpreted Pace as vali-
dating all state miscegenation laws.233  
In short, all post-bellum progress toward marriage equality was ultimately 
pared back such that by the end of the nineteenth century, miscegenation laws 
blanketed the country.234In the aftermath of Pace, America settled into being a 
country largely under the grip of miscegenation laws. After 1887, until Califor-
nia’s 1948 Perez v. Sharp decision, no state with a miscegenation law abolished 
its ban on interracial marriage either legislatively or judicially.235 Federal courts 
continued to uphold the constitutionality of miscegenation statutes well into the 
mid-twentieth century.236 The nation certainly had no deeply rooted tradition of 
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1602 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1563 
recognizing a right to interracial marriage at the time that the Perez plaintiffs 
brought their case to the California Supreme Court—indeed, most of the nation 
had a long, if not entirely unbroken, tradition of barring interracial marriage. 
Given the history of miscegenation laws, in his dissent in Perez, Justice 
Shenk foreshadowed Justice Alito’s tradition argument in Windsor. Justice 
Shenk noted that most states maintained miscegenation laws and “[t]he ban on 
mixed marriages in this country is traceable from the early colonial period.”237 
The Perez dissent provided a brief history of California’s anti-miscegenation 
regime, noting that the first session of the California Legislature declared “mar-
riages between white persons and Negroes to be illegal and void.”238 The State 
of California had periodically expanded the reach of its miscegenation laws, as 
when it amended the civil code to prohibit “marriages . . . between white persons 
and members of the Malay race.”239 Ultimately, the Perez dissent could not 
comprehend how a law that had been “constitutionally enforceable in this state 
for nearly 100 years” could suddenly be “unconstitutional under the same Con-
stitution and with no change in the factual situation.”240 
Like Perez, the Loving opinion represented a break with tradition—a tradi-
tion that virtually defined the culture of a region for decades. The tradition of 
anti-miscegenation regimes was self-reinforcing as courts often considered mis-
cegenation laws constitutional, in part, because of their longevity. This created “a 
tautological system in which attorneys and judges ‘knew’ the laws were constitu-
tional because previous judges had ruled so, and those judges had ruled so be-
cause they ‘knew’ their interpretations of the law to be correct.”241 The Loving 
Court soundly rejected the notion that tradition necessarily makes a statute con-
stitutional.242 
Nevertheless, Justice Alito tried to resurrect the tradition defense rejected in 
Loving when he construed Edith Windsor and the U.S. Department of Justice as 
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seeking “not the protection of a deeply rooted right but the recognition of a very 
new right.”243 The validity of Justice Alito’s argument depends on how the “tra-
dition” in question is defined. Edith Windsor was not asking for a new right to 
same-sex marriage; Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer were legally married. Wind-
sor was not asking for the right to marry; she was challenging a recent law that 
denied her the federal benefits associated with a state right she had already exer-
cised. One could argue that Windsor was, in fact, on the side of tradition—that of 
the federal government recognizing marriages that were valid in the states in 
which the couple is domiciled. 
Windsor’s challenge asked the Court to respect America’s legal tradition of 
the federal government recognizing legal state marriages. Unlike Loving, the 
Windsor Court was not called on to review a long-lived traditional state law.244 
Rather, the Court was evaluating a profoundly untraditional federal law that 
trespassed upon the states’ traditional right to define marriage for the purposes of 
all government benefits.245 Windsor challenged a federal law of recent vintage 
that refused to recognize state-sanctioned legally valid marriages between con-
senting adults. DOMA represented no tradition; it constituted a new and unprec-
edented federal intrusion into the issue of state-sanctioned marriages. 246 Edith 
Windsor was not demanding a new right; DOMA had extinguished an old right. 
Finally, even if one accepts Justice Alito’s framing of the issue, that Wind-
sor was in fact asking the Supreme Court to recognize a new right, tradition is 
not a barrier to unconstitutionality. A state’s traditional views of marriage do not 
trump rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Thus, state bans on same-sex 
marriage are no more immune from invalidation than were state bans on interra-
cial marriage. 
In sum, the notion that DOMA was deeply rooted in tradition is specious. 
The federal government has long allowed states to define the requirements of 
marriage between two people. Tradition held that the federal government de-
ferred to state marriage requirements regarding age, race, gender, etc. Virginia’s 
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miscegenation law was traditional; DOMA was not. The “tradition” canard is an 
argument against the majority opinion in Loving, not Windsor.247 
V. UNKNOWN CONSEQUENCES 
Finally, Justice Alito’s Windsor dissent speculated about the uncertain long-
term consequences of same-sex marriage on the institution of marriage more 
broadly. He opined that “[t]he long-term consequences of [accepting same-sex 
marriage] are not now known and are unlikely to be ascertainable for some time 
to come.” 248 Again presenting his hostility to marriage equality as an act of hu-
mility, Justice Alito warned that “[a]t present, no one—including social scien-
tists, philosophers, and historians—can predict with any certainty what the long-
term ramifications of widespread acceptance of same-sex marriage will be. And 
judges are certainly not equipped to make such an assessment.”249 In the face of 
uncertainty, Justice Alito reasoned, federal judges should not strike down DO-
MA.250 This Part recounts the use of this type of argument in several miscegena-
tion cases and concludes that Justice Alito used this argument ultimately as a 
scare tactic that would have been more timely as a dissent in 1967 in Loving v. 
Virginia. 
Justice Alito’s formulation of his uncertainty concerns is telling. He set up 
certainty of consequence as a criterion for recognizing constitutional rights as he 
simultaneously asserted that the Court cannot “for some time to come” achieve 
the necessary level of certainty regarding marriage equality. He implied that the 
Court should know the “long-term consequences” of marriage equality before 
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the federal government should be required to recognize marriages that are valid 
in one-third of U.S. states. Justice Alito did not define his vision of what consti-
tutes “long term.” Is it until the children of same-sex married couples reach 
adulthood? Is it the time necessary to determine whether all children raised in 
states with marriage equality have stable marriages throughout their lives? While 
voting to deny marriage equality to millions of Americans, Justice Alito gave no 
explanation of what “long-term consequences” we—lawyers, social scientists, 
citizens—should be looking for or how to measure them. Ultimately, the justice 
appeared to be attempting to keep the issue of marriage equality away from fed-
eral courts for a generation or more. 
Similarly, those opposed to miscegenation argued that interracial marriage 
had unknown consequences that required courts to uphold the constitutionality 
of miscegenation laws. Supporters of miscegenation laws raised several types of 
uncertainty arguments. First, one uncertainty defense of miscegenation bans took 
the form of concern about the balance of power between the states and federal 
government should the U.S. Constitution be interpreted to bar states from pro-
hibiting interracial marriage. Linking the states’ rights issue to the indefinite ef-
fect of federal involvement in marriage matters, the Supreme Court of Indiana 
worried in 1871 in State v. Gibson about allowing federal intrusion: “If the fed-
eral government can determine who may marry in a state, there is no limit to its 
power.”251 The consequences could ultimately “result in the destruction of the 
states.”252 
Second, opponents of interracial marriage spoke about both the unknown—
and predicted dire—consequences of allowing interracial couples to marry and 
have children.253 Most infamously, the Georgia Supreme Court in Scott v. State 
upheld that state’s constitutional provision prohibiting marriages between a 
white person and a black person because: 
[The law] was dictated by wise statesmanship, and has a broad and 
solid foundation in enlightened policy, sustained by sound reason and 
common sense. The amalgamation of the races is not only unnatural, 
but is always productive of deplorable results. Our daily observation 
shows us, that the offspring of these unnatural connections are gener-
ally sickly and effeminate, and that they are inferior in physical de-
velopment and strength, to the full-blood of either race.254 
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The dissent in Perez v. Sharp quoted with approval the offensive text of Scott,255 
as did other state courts in their opinions upholding miscegenation states.256 In 
Perez, the State argued “that persons wishing to marry in contravention of race 
barriers come from the ‘dregs of society’ and that their progeny will therefore be 
a burden on the community.”257 Miscegenation laws were thus necessary to 
“prevent[] the birth of children who might become social problems.”258 Histori-
cally, these arguments were not limited to the children of black-white interracial 
couples. When California was drafting its constitution around 1880, the chair-
man of the Committee on the Chinese urged lawmakers to include the Chinese in 
California’s miscegenation law: “‘Were the Chinese to amalgamate at all with 
our people, it would be the lowest, most vile and degraded of our race, and the 
result of that amalgamation would be a hybrid of the most despicable, a mongrel 
of the most detestable that has ever afflicted the earth.’”259 
After smearing the children of interracial couples as somehow defective, 
supporters of miscegenation laws changed tack and asserted that such laws were 
necessary to protect these same children by preventing them from being born. In 
the Loving case, the State argued that interracial couples experience a higher rate 
of divorce, which would be unfair to the children and, thus, interracial marriage 
should be prohibited.260 The State next quoted an academic text for the proposi-
tion that interracial marriage constitutes “‘a threat to the children of such a mar-
riage, in that it may tend to make them marginal in their relationships to parents 
. . . or their races,” which “create[s] a threat to their welfare and to the welfare of 
society as well because highly charged emotional experiences often leave such 
children disturbed, frustrated and unable to believe that they can live normal, 
happy lives.’”261 Similarly, the State in Perez argued that “the progeny of a mar-
                                                                                                                           
 255 Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 40 (Cal. 1948) (Shenk, J., dissenting). 
 256 See, e.g., State v. Tutty, 41 F. 753, 756 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1890); Eggers v. Olson, 231 P. 483, 486 
(Okla. 1924); Blake v. Sessions, 220 P. 876, 879 (Okla. 1923); In re Atkin’s Estate, 3 P.2d 682, 686 
(Okla. 1931) (Riley, J., dissenting). 
 257 Perez, 198 P.2d at 25. Similarly, the State of Virginia in Loving argued that couples who in-
termarry are “people who have a rebellious attitude toward society, self-hatred, neurotic tendencies, 
immaturity, and other detrimental psychological factors.” MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT 284 (Peter 
Irons & Stephanie Guitton eds., 1993). 
 258 Perez, 198 P.2d at 25. 
 259 MORAN, supra note 9, at 31 (quoting 1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTION-
AL CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA, 1878–79, at 632 (1880) (statement of John F. Miller at California’s 
state constitutional convention)). 
 260 Brief for Appellee, supra note 128, at *47–48. 
 261 Id. at Appendix B (quoting ALBERT I. GORDON, INTERMARRIAGE: INTERFAITH, INTERRACIAL, 
INTERETHNIC (1964)). Similarly, the Supreme Court of Louisiana upheld its miscegenation law by—
surprisingly and perhaps disingenuously—invoking Brown v. Board of Education and the need to 
protect children: 
A state statute which prohibits intermarriage or cohabitation between members of dif-
ferent races we think falls squarely within the police power of the state, which has an 
interest in maintaining the purity of the races and in preventing the propagation of half-
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riage between a Negro and a Caucasian suffer not only the stigma of such inferi-
ority but the fear of rejection by members of both races.”262 
Other claimed unknown consequences included the effect of interracial 
marriage on race relations in the nation.263 Segregationists predicted “dire con-
sequences” from the so-called “‘intermixture and amalgamation of races.’”264 
For example, in 1947, Mississippi Senator Theodore Bilbo argued that 
“‘[s]eparation leads to the preservation of both the white and Negro races, to a 
future which belongs to God. Mongrelization leads to the destruction of our Na-
tion itself.’”265 In upholding its state miscegenation law in 1871 in Lonas v. 
State, the Tennessee Supreme Court reasoned that “any effort to intermerge the 
individuality of the races [should be regarded] as a calamity full of the saddest 
and gloomiest portent to the generations that are to come after us.”266 The Perez 
dissent worried whether interracial marriage would lead to the extinction of the 
white race as the dissent knew it.267 
Unlike the Perez dissent and supporters of miscegenation laws, Justice 
Alito did not go into detail about the particular “long-term consequences” that he 
                                                                                                                           
breed children. Such children have difficulty in being accepted by society, and there is 
no doubt that children in such a situation are burdened, as has been said in another con-
nection, with “a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect 
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.” 
State v. Brown, 108 So. 2d 233, 234 (La. 1959) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 
(1954)). 
 262 Perez, 198 P.2d at 26 (“If they do, the fault lies not with their parents, but with the prejudices 
in the community and the laws that perpetuate those prejudices by giving legal force to the belief that 
certain races are inferior. If miscegenous marriages can be prohibited because of tensions suffered by 
the progeny, mixed religious unions could be prohibited on the same ground.”). 
 263 For example, a Georgia federal court asserted that it would “be impossible to overstate the 
importance of this question under the grave and unsettled relations which exist between the distinct 
races now inhabiting a large portion of these United States, and it will be neither wise nor patriotic for 
the court to evade the vital point of decision, as might perhaps be done in this case.” Tutty, 41 F. at 
756. 
 264 Bank, supra note 120, at 310 (quoting 2 CONG. REC. 4169 (1874) (statement of Sen. Sauls-
bury)). 
 265 SICKELS, supra note 20, at 36 (quoting THEODORE G. BILBO, TAKE YOUR CHOICE 292 
(1947)). 
 266 50 Tenn. 287, 311 (1871). 
 267 Perez, 198 P.2d at 44 (Shenk, J., dissenting) (“On the biological phase there is authority for 
the conclusion that the crossing of the primary races leads gradually to retrogression and to eventual 
extinction of the resultant type unless it is fortified by reunion with the parent stock.”); id. at 46 (“The 
regulation does not rest solely upon a difference in race. The question is not merely one of difference, 
nor of superiority or inferiority, but of consequence and result. The underlying factors that constitute 
justification for laws against miscegenation closely parallel those which sustain the validity of prohi-
bitions against incest and incestuous marriages.”). Similarly, in 1909, Senator William H. Milton of 
Florida championed a federal miscegenation law, arguing that “the mixture of blacks with whites 
would result in the extinction of the Caucasian race because ‘one drop of negro blood makes one a 
negro . . . a child of the jungle.’” ROBINSON, supra note 36, at 82–83 (quoting 43 CONG. REC. 3443, 
3480–83 (1909)). 
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believed warranted denying federal recognition of valid state marriages. Justice 
Alito seemed to imply that federal recognition of same-sex marriage might have 
negative consequences for family structure and stability. Virginia’s legal counsel 
made this same argument in Loving. After noting the State’s “natural, direct, and 
vital interest in maximizing the number of successful marriages which lead to 
stable homes and families and in minimizing those which do not,” the State as-
serted that miscegenation laws were necessary because “intermarried families 
are subjected to much greater pressures and problems than are those of the intra-
married.”268 State officials did not seem to appreciate that miscegenation laws 
may cause and facilitate the problems they articulated. 
Justice Alito’s lack of clearly articulated specific consequences is a shrewd 
omission. Opponents of civil rights for minorities generally forgot their prior 
positions after history had proven their dire predictions of the consequences of, 
for example, interracial marriage, to be false, wrong-headed, and indeed bigot-
ed.269 The concern about creating a record that in hindsight does not survive the 
test of time makes Justice Alito’s vague insinuations a discerning strategy. Nev-
ertheless, opponents of marriage equality in Perez, Loving, and Windsor all em-
ployed the scare tactic of unforeseen and/or grim consequences should marriage 
restrictions be lifted. None of these predictions have proven correct. 
Ultimately, using the prospect of unknown consequences to deny equal 
rights is breathtakingly broad. This type of argument could be applied to all judi-
cial decision making. Every equal protection case could potentially have unin-
tended consequences. The justification also is selectively employed.270 “Un-
known consequences” is a convenient argument, but not a principled one. Fear 
of the unknown is not a legitimate government interest that justifies discrimina-
tion. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Loving v. Virginia was 
unanimous, Justice Alito’s dissent in United States v. Windsor provides some 
insights into what a Loving dissent would have looked like. The California Su-
preme Court in 1948 in Perez v. Sharp broke new ground in marriage equality 
                                                                                                                           
 268 MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 257, at 282–83. 
 269 See PASCOE, supra note 2, at 291–92 (citing CAROL A. HORTON, RACE AND THE MAKING OF 
AMERICAN LIBERALISM 192–93, 199–204 (2005)); Paul Finkelman, The Color of Law, 87 NW. U. L. 
REV. 937, 945 (1993). 
 270 For example, Justice Alito expressed no concern about unknown consequences of extending 
the Second Amendment to create an individual right to carry handguns. District of Columbia v. Hel-
ler, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). Nor did he seem to care that the Constitution is silent on the issue of 
handguns, which did not exist at the time of the Second Amendment. Cf. supra notes 110–144 and 
accompanying text (noting Justice Alito’s invocation of constitutional silence as to same-sex mar-
riage). 
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but with a strong dissent from three of the Court’s seven justices. The Perez dis-
sent advanced precisely the same arguments against recognizing interracial mar-
riages that Justice Alito made against recognizing same-sex marriages.271 Justice 
Alito’s Windsor dissent appears to have been cribbed from Justice Shenk’s Perez 
dissent. 
When listening to the arguments made against same-sex marriage, Mildred 
Loving herself observed the similarities between her struggle during the sixties 
and the current legal battle for marriage equality: 
Mrs. Loving observed that many people in her generation had be-
lieved “it was God’s plan to keep people apart and that the govern-
ment should discriminate against people in love.” Not a “day goes 
by,” she continued, “that I don’t think of Richard and our love, our 
right to marry, and how much it meant to me to have that freedom to 
marry the person precious to me, even if others thought he was the 
‘wrong kind of person’ for me to marry. I believe all Americans, no 
matter their race, no matter their sex, no matter their sexual orienta-
tion, should have that same freedom to marry. Government has no 
business imposing some people’s religious beliefs over others. Espe-
cially if it denies people’s civil rights . . . . I support the freedom to 
marry for all. That’s what Loving, and loving, are all about.”272 
When we look back at the 1960s fight for marriage equality, most Ameri-
cans feel a collective sense of shame that the apparatus of government was 
channeled to hurt loving couples. Younger generations are often stunned that 
interracial marriage was considered such a big deal by so many people for so 
long. Younger Americans see the arguments employed against interracial mar-
riage to be offensive, transparent, and deeply flawed. Thus, it is particularly dis-
turbing—and telling—that Justice Alito and other opponents of marriage equali-
ty for same-sex couples are recycling these same discredited arguments. It is also 
both sad and ironic that the only other justice to sign on to Justice Alito’s dissent 
was Justice Clarence Thomas, whose marriage to his wife would have constitut-
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ed criminal conduct under Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law had not the Loving 
Court rejected all of the arguments advanced in Justice Alito’s dissent in Wind-
sor. 
Justice Alito takes umbrage at the implication that he and his fellow oppo-
nents of civil rights for gay people could be perceived as bigoted for cleaving to 
their distaste for all things gay. He attacked today’s civil rights leaders as 
“cast[ing] all those who cling to traditional beliefs about the nature of marriage 
in the role of bigots or superstitious fools.”273 Segregationists tried to claim this 
same moral high ground in the miscegenation debate, such as when the State of 
Virginia in its Loving brief argued that “the tendency to classify all persons who 
oppose intermarriage as ‘prejudiced’ is, in itself, a prejudice.”274 “Prejudiced” is 
a moniker that did not stick to opponents of miscegenation laws. Instead, today’s 
society views proponents of miscegenation laws as prejudiced—as bigoted—
despite couching their hostility to interracial marriage as authorized or mandated 
by tradition. 
What ultimately is the significance of Justice Alito’s dissent in Windsor? 
Not only is it a direct rebuttal to the unanimous decision in Loving. Justice 
Alito’s dissent is also a rehearsal; it is a first draft written in anticipation of a fu-
ture Supreme Court case involving a federal constitutional challenge to a state 
law prohibition on same-sex marriage. Such a case would be more directly anal-
ogous to the posture of Loving than was Windsor. That is why it is important to 
view Justice Alito’s Windsor dissent through the lens of Loving. This makes it 
easier to see that Justice Alito is recycling the same discredited arguments that 
were used to justify the criminalization of interracial marriage. Understanding 
Loving and the history of miscegenation laws provides context for the current 
debate over marriage equality. 
What would we think today of a dissent in Loving, if one had been written? 
That is probably how future generations of Americans—historians and ordinary 
citizens—will view Justice Alito’s dissent in Windsor. In the end, however, the 
important issue is not Justice Alito’s legacy. It is the ability of millions of Ameri-
cans to exercise their constitutional right to marry in the same way that Sylvester 
Davis and Andrea Perez were allowed after the California Supreme Court struck 
down that state’s miscegenation law. Although progress toward marriage equali-
ty has been made at a heartening pace, same-sex couples across the country are 
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still waiting for their Loving. As state and federal courts consider constitutional 
challenges to bans on same-sex marriage, judges should take heed not to accept 
the arguments used to bolster miscegenation laws. These arguments have been 
soundly and rightly rejected. 
 
  
 
